THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975:
SENTENCING-LAW AND ORDER WITH
A VENGEANCE
Daniel Crystal*

"That's fantastic. You mean Congress is considering a bill to
keep the public from finding out what their government is up to?"
"Correct .... With S-i you will never have another Watergate
scandal, a Lockheed overrun hearing, a Pentagon Papers revelation
or an IRS investigation. We'll have clean government for the first
time in our history."
"Do you think Congress will vote for S-i?".
"Why not. If they're dumb enough to propose it, they're dumb
enough to pass it."

Art Buchwald'
INTRODUCTION

There exist today two widely disparate philosophical approaches
to the problem of crime in America. One approach, which attributes
crime to a condition of social permissiveness, would seek to remedy

the problem through authoritarian restraint of individuals. Such is the
nature of the law and order approach voiced by former President
Richard M. Nixon, who decried the "sense of permissiveness" that
characterized America in the 1960's, and who concluded that "the
only way to attack crime in America is the way crime attacks our

people-without pity. '"2 The other approach characterizes crime as
the irrational response of powerless people to a society which fails to
* A.B., Montclair State College; J.D., George Washington University National Law
Center; Member, New Jersey, District of Columbia & United States Supreme Court
Bars. An earlier article by the author dealing with the same bill appeared in 6 SETON
HALL L. REV. 591 (1975).
1 Buchwald, To Err Is Human, N.Y. Post, Oct. 11, 1975, at 27, col. 3 (emphasis
added).
2 Sixth in a Series of Presidential Messages to the Congress on the State of the
Union, 9 PRES. Doc. 259, 260-61 (March 14, 1973), reprinted in Hearings on Reform of
the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcooiin. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4819-20 (1973). [These hearings are part of a congressional investigation into the reform and recodification of fed-
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provide acceptable alternative means for achieving those personal
comforts often sought after through criminal activity. 3 Proponents of
this view see most criminals as victims themselves, and therefore
would remedy the problem of crime in America through reorientation
of national priorities to remove the basic causes of crime and also
through a program of humanistic and rehabilitative treatment of
offenders. 4 Each position has powerful support. Very soon, this country must make a fateful election between them. While progressive
forces have made some gains, the fear of crime has often led to proposals for "tough" solutions completely at odds with the recommendations of penologists. One such proposal has recently been presented to the nation's legislators and has apparently received broad
support.
Now pending in Congress are ponderous 753-page companion
bills-S. 1 and H.R. 3907-which, if enacted, will constitute the
Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975. This proposed statute offers
harsh and repressive measures as its solution to crime. It stands
counter to the thinking of those who believe that crime will be reduced only to the extent that the social conditions which create it are
ameliorated. Whether this statute and its approach toward the problem of crime should be adopted in this country will be one of the
most important decisions this Congress will be asked to make. The
Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, once adopted, will probably set
the guidelines for federal criminal law for many years to come.
S. l's legislative history dates back to 1966 when Congress established what is popularly known as the "Brown Commission" to make
eral criminal law, continuing from 1971 to the present. They are paginated consecutively through part 11 and will hereinafter be collectively cited as Hearings.]
For a similar view see President Ford's Special Message to Congress on Crime, 11
PRES. Doc. 652, 653 (June 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Message on Crime]:
For too long, law has centered its attention more on the rights of the criminal defendant than on the victim of crime. It is time for law to concern itself
more with the rights of the people it exists to protect.
3See, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 36-37 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
According to former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
[r]iots, muggings, robbery and rape are loathsome not only because they are
inherently irrational and inhumane but because they and their causes are so
foreign to the experience of people with power that they are incomprehensible.
If opportunities open to the poor offered more rational and humane avenues to
the ends sought by crime, these means would be utilized. It is the inhumane
and irrational condition of the poor that finally causes some among them to
commit such crimes.
Id. at 36.
4See, e.g., Macpherson, Probation and Corrections in the Setenties, FED. PROB.,
March 1971, at 14.
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recommendations for a recodification of the federal criminal code. 5 In
1971, the Commission submitted its final report to the President and
Congress. 6 Three bills resulted. One version was S. 1400 of the 93d
Congress, produced at the behest of President Nixon by the Department of Justice headed by former Attorney General John Mitchell.
While the provisions in S. 1400 superficially resembled those of the
Brown Commission report, S. 1400 was in reality a far different proposal, imbued with the Nixon hard-line approach to crime. 7 A second
bill was S. 1 of the 93d Congress, drafted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.8

A

third duplicated

the Brown Commission

recoin-

5 This commission was established by Congress as the National Commission on Beform of Federal Criminal Laws. It was chaired by former governor of California, Edmund C. "Pat" Brown.
The Commission was given the responsibility to
make a full and complete review and study of the statutory and case law of the
United States which constitutes the federal system of criminal justice for the
purpose of formulating and recommending to the Congress legislation which
would improve the federal system of criminal justice. It shall be the further
duty of the Commission to make recommendations for revision and recodification of the criminal laws of the United States, including the repeal of unnecessary or undesirable statutes and such changes in the penalty structure as the
Commission may feel will better serve the ends of justice.
Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, § 3, 80 Stat. 1516-17. During its deliberations,
the Brown Comlission Published a study draft and two volumes of "working papers" in
which much of the Commission's reasoning was expounded. NAT'L CO*iM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS (1970) [hereinafter cited as
WORKING PAPERS].
6 NAT'L COMM'N

ON

REFORM

OF

FEDERAL

CRIMINAL

LAWS,

FINAL

REPORT

[hereinafter cited as BROWN COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2,
at 129. See generally Levine, The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code: A Constitu.......
juidcon
An.....
39 BROOKLY L. R~v. 1 1-2 (1972): McClellan.
Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal
Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663, 663-65; Note, The Proposed Federal Penal Code, 47
N.Y.U.L. REv. 320, 320 (1972). For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history of S.
1 of the 94th Congress see the remarks of Senator John McClellan made before the
Senate while introducing S. I to Congress, 121 CONG. REC. S33-S38 (daily ed. Jan. 15,
1975).
7 S. 1400, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 4862.
After receiving the Brown Commission's report, President Nixon directed the Attorney
General to create a special unit to study and evaluate the proposal. Statement by the
President After Receipt of the Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 PRES. Doc. 68-69 (Jan. 16, 1971). See also The President's
Memorandum to the Attorney General Directing Action, 7 PRES. Doc. 69 (Jan. 16,
1971).
S. 1400, introduced in 1973, was preceded by a State of the Union message presenting an outline of the draft code and reiterating President Nixon's view of crime and the
need for a tough approach to its solution. See Sixth in a Series of Presidential Messages
to the Congress on the State of the Union, 9 PRES. Doc. 259 (March 14, 1973).
For an extensive comparison between S. 1400 and the Brown Commission recom-
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mendations. 9 The present bill, S. 1 of the 94th Congress, is virtually
the same as S. 1400; many of the regressive sections of that bill appear verbatim in the new criminal code that S. 1 would-if
passed-make binding federal law. 10
An earlier article by this author concluded that, in instance after
instance, S. 1 would drastically curtail and virtually repeal important
provisions in the Bill of Rights, particularly those involving first amendment freedoms. 1 More specifically, that paper dealt with crimes
against the Government, such as treason, sabotage, espionage, mishandling of government information and obstruction of government
functions, as well as with the so-called Nuremberg defense, and other
civil-liberties issues presented by S. 1. This article will analyze how
S. 1 deals with the disposition of criminal offenders, specifically, its
approach toward sentencing, probation, parole, appellate review of
sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty.
No one can or should minimize the seriousness of crime in
mendations, written by the latter's director, Louis B. Schwartz, see Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 13 CRI.
L. REP. 3265 (1973).
s S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 4211.
9 H.R. 10047, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The counterpart of H.R. 10047 in the
present Congress is H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). It was introduced in the
House by Representative Kastenmeier for himself and Representatives Edwards, Eilberg, and Mikva and was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, 121 CONG.
REC. H154 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1975).
10 See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Section 101 sets out the bill's proposed
revision and codification of Title 18 of the United States Code. Hereinafter citation to
"S. 1 § _
- in this article will refer to the designated section of that proposed codification. The quotation marks contained in section 101 of the bill will be omitted. Similarly,
section 102 sets out S. l's proposed revisions to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hereinafter citation to "Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P.
'
will refer to that proposed rule. Quotation marks will also be omitted.
11 See Crystal, The Proposed Federal Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975: A Civil
Liberties Critique, 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 591 (1975).
Much of the press comment on S. 1 has been devoted to the threats it contains to
freedom of the press, particularly those embraced in the "Official Secrets Act" provisions providing stiff criminal penalties for possession or use of classified information. In
a lead editorial published Tuesday, May 6, 1975, The Newv York Times wrote:
There is now tinder active consideration in the Senate Judiciary Committee
a bill that constitutes a grave danger to freedom of the press and to the right of
every citizen to know how his Government conducts foreign and military policy.
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1975, at 88, col. 1. The Chicago Tribume in an editorial, June 15,
1975, stated that
by trying to seal every crack in the Pentagon walls, the McClellan subcommittee has actually constructed a concrete strait jacket that can be clapped on to
any journalist at the slightest whim of burocrats [sic].
Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1975, § 2, at 4, cols. 1-2.
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America. It is a reality that citizens are afraid to walk the streets at
night. Moreover, it is not only the affluent who suffer: Minority residents of our inner cities are victimized by serious crime to a greater
degree than are their white counterparts living elsewhere.1 2 The public demand that violent crime be ended is legitimate and proper.
Whether this demand can realistically and satisfactorily be met by the
harsh and vindictive law-and-order approach incorporated into S. 1
and H.R. 3907 is quite another matter.' 3 The tragedy of Attica proves
that deep-seated problems do not go away merely because convicted
criminals are in fact sent to prison. It is imperative that one analyzing
the provisions of S. 1, which would promote the imposition of protracted prison terms, soberly consider the reality of prison life today,
the high rate of recidivism in both federal and state penal systems,
and the lack of rehabilitation of prisoners. 14
12The constant fear which pervades inner-city life is vividly described by Vernon
L. Jordan, Executive Director of the National Urban League, who contends that unlike
the situation in white, middle-class communities,
[i]n the black ghetto, . .. crime is an ever present danger, a deadly constant
that imprisons the elderly behind triple-locked doors, subjects women and
children to personal attacks, and makes every man a target of violence. For
black people, who are four times as likely as white people to be robbed, twice
as likely to be assaulted, and four times as likely to be raped, crime and the
fear that accompanies it is a reality, a frightful reality that drains the vitality of
our neighborhoods.
This is why black people want the incidence of crime slashed drastically.
This is why black people want realistic programs instituted to cut crime. Black
people are doubly victimized-first, by the high incidence of crime against us;
second, by exploitation of the high rates of crimes committed by blacks so that
we are further isolated and so that this country is even further divided along
racial lines.
Jordan, The System Propagates Crime, 20 CRIME & DELIN. 233, 234 (1974).
President Ford himself candidly acknowledged that
[m]ost of the victims of violent crimes are the poor, the old, the young, the
disadvantaged minorities, the people who live in the most crowded parts of our
cities, the most defenseless. These victims have a valid claim on the rest of
society for protection and personal safety that they cannot provide for themselves; in a phrase, for domestic tranquility.
Message on Crime, supra note 2, at 655.
13 For a criticism of the Nixon law-and-order approach to crime see Jordan, supra
note 12; Wilkinson, The Era of Libertarian Repression-1948 to 1973: From Congressman to President, With Substantial Support from the Liberal Establishment, 7 AKRON
L. REV. 280 (1974). See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS (1968); Hughes, Corrections Reform: We Are Our Brother's Keeper, 2
SETON HALL L. REV. 311 (1971); Wolfgang, Violence, U.S.A.-Riots and Crime, 14
CRIME & DELIN. 289 (1968).
14 According to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice:
Life in many institutions is at best barren and futile, at worst unspeakably
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Basic Sentencing Structure

Generally, the sentences proposed by S. 1 evidence a preoccupation with punitive considerations at the expense of crime prevention
and rehabilitation of offenders. This preoccupation is apparent in the
length of the proposed authorized prison sentences,' 5 the provisions
for increased sentences for "dangerous special offenders," 16 and the
insufficiency of restraints on consecutive sentencing. 1 7 It is also manifested in certain proposed criteria required to be evaluated by federal

courts

probation, 19

in determining

fines, 20

terms

of imprisonment,

8

terms

of

ineligibility. 2 '

and parole
The severity of the
proposed statute is also reflected in provisions which would (a) enable
the Government to appeal sentences imposed at trial in order to have
them increased, 2 2 (b) reimpose the death penalty, 23 and (c) extend
24
capital punishment to crimes never before punishable by death.
Furthermore, President Ford in a recent message to Congress has
recommended that the sentencing provisions be made even stricter
brutal and degrading. To be sure, the offenders in such institutions are incapacitated from committing further crimes while serving their sentences, but
the conditions in which they live are the poorest possible preparation for their
successful reentry into society, and often merely reinforce in them a pattern of
manipulation or destructiveness.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967). Characterizing American

penal institutions, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has stated:
They are breeding places of crime, violence and despair.
It would be difficult to devise a better method of draining the last drop of
compassion from a human being than confinement in most prisons as they exist
today. In a climate of fear and violence many wardens work only to avoid the
general disorder that can wreck their prisons. They hope only to release the
most violent inmates before they cause trouble inside and are so relieved to see
the dangerous ones go that they disregard the public safety-and the fact that
most will be back before long.
CLARK, supra note 3, at 214.
15 See S. 1 § 2301(b).
16See id. § 2301(c).
17 See id. § 2304.
18 See id. § 2302(a).
19See id. § 2102(a).
20 See id. § 2202(a).
21See id. § 2302(c).
22 See id. § 3725(a)(2).
23 See id. § 2401.
24 S. 1 provides for a mandatory death penalty for sabotage and various espionage
and murder offenses which heretofore could have been punishable by imprisonment
alone. Compare id. §§ 1601 (murder), 1111 (sabotage), 1121 (espionage) and id.
§ 2401(a) (death penalty requirements) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 (murder), 2151-57 (sabotage), and 792-99 (espionage) (1970). See also note 28 infra.
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by modifying them to include mandatory ininmum sentences for cer25
tain crimes.
S. 1 classifies federal offenses into nine categories, comprised of
five classes of felonies, three classes of misdemeanors, and a class of
lesser offenses

termed "infractions. '"26

The maximum fines 2 7 and

terms of imprisonment authorized by S. 1 are inordinately severe.
Furthermore, a tenth category is created, in effect, by a special subclass of felonies punishable by death.
A Class A felony is punishable by life imprisonment, 28 a
Class B felony by up to thirty years' imprisonment, 29 a Class C

felony by up to fifteen years, 30 a Class D felony by up to seven
25 See Message on Crime, supra note 2, at 655.
26 See S. 1 § 2301(b).

27 Id. § 2201 authorizes the imposition of fines on individual offenders ranging from
a maximum of $1,000 for infractions to a maximum of $100,000 for felonies, unless
monetary gain was derived or personal or property injury was caused through an offense. In such cases, an offender could be fined as much as double the gross gain derived or double the gross injury caused, whichever is the greater.
Under S. 1, convicted organizations are punishable by fines ranging from a maximun of $10,000 for infractions to a maximum of $500,000 for felonies, or double the
value of any illicit gain or personal or property injury caused. Id.
28 Id. § 2301(b)(1). Typical Class A felonies under S. 1 are the following: murder
(§ 1601); kidnapping (§ 1621); espionage (§ 1121); sabotage (§ 1111); and treason (§
1101). For each of these offenses other than murder, lesser grades are possible, depending on specified circumstances. In this author's earlier article, it was noted that the
extremely broad definitions for espionage, sabotage, and treason make the death penalty
legally applicable to newsmen printing classified information in wartime, to workers
who can be charged with impeding war activities and who therefore can be found guilty
of sabotage, and to other means of opposition to an unpopular war; and that these provision5s
aerordinglv present grave questions of a chilling effect upon first amendment
freedoms. See Crystal, supra note 11, at 602-04, 629-37.
29 1d. § 2301(b)(2). Among federal offenses classified as Class B felonies are the
following: aircraft hijacking (§ 1631); sabotage "-here the offense is committed in time
of war but does not damage major offensive or defensive weapons systems, or where it
is committed during a national defense emergency (§ 111 1(b)(2)); trafficking in an opiate
if(1) the opiate weighs at least four ounces; (2)the opiate isdistributed to an individual
under eighteen years of age who is five or more years younger than the defendant; or
(.3) the defendant has a prior opiate-related felony conviction or had been arrested but
not tried for some previous drug-related offense (§ 1811(b)(1)); racketeering (§ 1802(b));
operating a racketeering syndicate (§ 1801(c)); criminal conspiracy where the most
serious crime that was an objective of the conspiracy was a Class A or Class B felony
(91002(e)); and espionage where Class A requirements are not met (§ 1121(b)(2)).
This last provision makes a reporter subject to a sentence of up to thirty years and a
fine of $100,000, as a Class B felon, if he writes a story on cost overruns, the building of
a secret naval base, or the carrying on of a secret war (such as that in Cambodia), since
the publication of any such story "'may be communicated to a foreign power.- Comipare
id. § 1121(b)(1) with id.§ 1121(b)(2).
30Id. § 2301(b)(3). Typical Class C felonies are the following: rape (§ 1641); manslaughter (§ 1602); maiming (§ 1611); arson (§ 1701); burglary (§ 1711); robbery (§
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years, 31 and a Class E felony by up to three years. 3 2 A Class A misdemeanor may bring a prison sentence of up to one year; 33 a Class B
misdemeanor, up to six months; 34 and a Class C misdemeanor, up to
30 days. 35 An infraction is punishable by imprisonment for not more
than five days. 36 Such harsh sentencing provisions are the result of
a "law and order" philosophy steeped in the belief that ferocity in
criminal penalties serves to deter crime. Yet commentators have
found that correctional procedures that rely primarily on the institutionalization of offenders fail to meet the purported objective of reducing crime because such institutionalization fails to rehabilitate and
37
leads to increased recidivism.
1721); extortion (§ 1722); theft when the property stolen is worth more than $100,000 (§
1731); blackmail where the property obtained thereby exceeds $100,000 in value (§
1723); disclosing national defense information during a war or "national defense
emergency" (§ 1122); "impairing military effectiveness" under certain circumstances (§
1112); instigating "the forcible overthrow or destruction of the government" (§ 1103);
and armed rebellion or insurrection (§ 1102).
31 Id. § 2301(b)(4). Among the Class D felonies are the following: negligent
homicide (§ 1603); aggravated battery (§ 1612); "terrorizing" (§ 1615); "aggravated criminal restraint" (§ 1622); sexual assault (§ 1642); criminal entry (§ 1712); theft of an
amount less than $100,000 but more than $500 (§ 1731); obtaining money by fraudulent
scheme (§ 1734); bankruptcy fraud over $500 (§ 1735); obstructing military recruitment
or induction (§ 1116); mishandling national defense information (§ 1123); and disclosing
classified information to an agent of a foreign power (§ 1124).
32 Id. § 2301(b)(5). Class E felonies include bankruptcy fraud under $500 (§ 1735);
sexual abuse of a minor if the defendant was an adult (§ 1643); reckless endangerment
where the defendant does not manifest extreme indifference to human life (§ 1617); and
disclosing classified information to anyone other than a foreign agent not authorized to
receive it (§ 1124(f)(2)).
33Id. § 2301(b)(6). Class A misdemeanors include communicating a threat or false
information endangering human life (§ 1616); criminal restraint (§ 1623); destroying
mail or property worth more than $500 (§ 1703); theft where the stolen property has a
value between 8100 and $500 (§ 1731); hindering law enforcement under some circumstances (§ 1311(d)(3)); and providing or possessing contraband in prison under stated
circumstances (§ 1314(b)(3)).
34 Id. § 2301(b)(7). Examples of Class B misdemeanors include the following: theft
of property valued at $100 or less (§ 1731); demonstrating to influence a judicial proceeding (§ 1328); and "joyriding" where the defendant is less than eighteen years old
(§ 1731(b)(4)).
3 Id. § 2301(b)(8). Among Class C misdemeanors are the following: battery where
committed in an unarmed fight or one entered into mutually (§ 1613(b)(2)); and "unlawful sexual contact" tinder specified conditions (§ 1645).
-Id. § 2301(b)(9). Typical infractions include: criminal trespass on unsecured government propertx other than buildings, if the property is not enclosed, and if the trespasser is without notice prohibiting the trespass (§ 1713); disorderly conduct (§ 1861);
and failing to obey a public safety order (§ 1862).
31 See, e.g., Cooper, Toward a Rational Doctrine of Rehabilitation, 19 CRiME &
DELIN. 228 (1973); Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55
VA. L. REV. 795, 804-12 (1969); Morris & Hawkins, Rehabilitation: Rhetoric and
Reality, FED. PROB., Dec. 1970, at 9; National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
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S. l's "law and order" thrust is also reflected in the criteria
which the judge is to consider when imposing sentence. The proposed code would require that the court consider the following:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant; and
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treat38
ment in the most effective manner.

Thus, under S. 1 it is not enough that the sentence "protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant" and deter criminal conduct; the sentence must also
"reflect the seriousness of the offense"
"promote respect for law"
"provide just punishment for the offense."
The criteria thus imposed would have a judge punish a defendant
beyond what is required for his individual wrong and even beyond
that required for deterrence, apparently in a single-minded attempt
to set an "example."
The major flaw with a "law and order" approach which looks to
increasedr penalties as a solution to crime is that it ignores the reality
that, sooner or later, most prisoners will return to societv; and unless
they are adequately rehabilitated, the prison will simply have proved
to have been a training school for further crime. Moreover, the very
factors that produce plea bargaining-the inadequacy both of the lawenforcement system which processes those accused of crime and of
the penal system which houses and maintains those convicted of crime
-make it clear that a program which emphasizes the imposition of increased terms of imprisonment for enlarged classes of offenders
threatens to break down the penal system itself 39 With these considInstitutional Construction:A Policy Statement, 18 CRIME & DELIN. 331 (1972); Pepper,
Prisons in Turmoil, FED. PROB., Dec. 1972, at 3; Note, Creative Punishment: A Study of
Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57, 60-63 (1975).
38S. 1 § 2302(a).
39 In point of fact, a strong argument could be made to support the proposition that
the penal system has already broken down. Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes of the Su-
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erations in mind, attention is now turned to other specific aspects of
S. l's sentencing provisions.
PROBATION

Under S. 1, the efficacv of federal probation as a law enforcement tool would be notably impeded for two reasons. First, the statute would wholly deny probation for numerous offenses by establishing mandatory prison sentences. Second, even where probation is an
option, the statute fails to require federal sentencing judges to consider the propriety of probation before imposing a harsher sentence.
It cannot be denied that many serious crimes committed in
America today are perpetrated by recidivists. One study released by
the F.B.I. indicated that two-thirds of all persons arrested by federal
authorities in 1971 were repeat offenders. 4 Another study, reported
by President Ford, indicated that, in one city in a twelve-month
period, ten people had committed more than sixty rapes, two
41
hundred burglaries, and fourteen murders.
The extraordinary pattern of habitual criminal activity demonstrated by these studies has generated a popular view that a demonstrable reduction in the national crime rate will result from the extended incarceration of offenders. This position rests on the theory
that if such detention becomes a mandatory sequel to conviction,
there will be less chance for first-time offenders to commit subsequent crimes, and offenses will be deterred if it is generally known
that conviction will certainly result in imprisonment. S. 1-because it

provides for mandatory incarceration for many crimes and because it
tilts decisively in the direction of establishing a legislative policy
which restricts rather than promotes the grant of probation-would, if
enacted, establish this deterrence policy as the law of the nation. It is
preme Court of New Jersey, writing at the time as Chairman of the ABA Commission on
Correctional Services and Facilities, has aptly pointed onut:
Today in America, our prisons, jails, juvenile training schools and probation

and parole machinery constitute what may be termed our correctional system.
This system can best be described as a confused morass which inflicts great
present harm, and poses a frightening, imminent threat to American societs'. "It
would be difficult to devise a better method of draining the last drop of compassion from a human being than confinement in most prisons as they exist
today."
Hughes, supro note 13, at 311 (quoting from CLARK, supra note 3, at 214). It has gotten
to the point where-as a former attorney general has stated--"[w]hen riots and fires do
not occur in . . . prisons, it is only because no one feels like starting them." CLARK,
supa note 3, at 213-14.
40 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIiE REPORTS-1971, at 36 (1972).
41 M1essage on Crime, supra note 2, at 656.
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the opinion of this author that a probation-oriented policy would be

more humane and economical than S. l's approach. Moreover, because it is a more individualized way of dealing with offenders, the
admitted bias of the author is that it will be the far better method of
preventing recidivism.

S. 1, as now drafted, provides for mandatory prison sentences
for all Class A felonies and other specified offenses, 4 2 including possession or trafficking in as little as four ounces of an opiate (including inarijuana) 4 3 or using a weapon in the course of committing a
crime. 4 4 President Ford has strongly recommended to Congress that

S. 1 be amended to require mandatory incarceration for such offenses
as kidnapping and aircraft hijacking. 45 Furthermore, it is the
President's "firm belief that persons convicted of violent crime should
be sent to prison. "46 Itcannot be gainsaid that the "tough" approach
by the President will have a popular appeal to an American citizenry
that has become infused with a fear of crime that one commentator

has termed "irrational. -47 Rational or not, this fear becomes a potent
tool for the political opportunist whose primary concern is to get
votes rather than to discover or make use of effective solutions to the
problem of crime. 48 Politicization of the crime problem is not a viable
42 S. 1 § 2101(a) provides:
A defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may he sentenced to a
term of probation unless the offense is a Class A felony or is an offense for
which probation has been expressly precluded.
43 S. 1 § 1811, dealing with trafficking in an opiate, provides in part: "Notvithstanding [other provisions] of this title, the court may not sentence the defendant to probation hut shall sentence him to a term of imprisonment.'
id. §§ 1815(5), (6) define
opiate" with regad to 21 U.S.C. } 82(e) (1)70), which includes marijuana.
44 S. 1 § 1823.
45 President Ford declared:
I propose that incarceration be made inandatory for (1) offenders who
commit oflenses under Federal jurisdiction using a dangerous weal)on; (2) persons committing such extraordinarily serious crimes as ailrcraft hijacking, kidnapping, and trafflicking in hard drigs: and (.3)repeat offeiers whi commit
Federal crioses-with or withou it
a weapon-that caiise ir have a potential to
cause personal injiry.
Message on Crime, supra note 2, at 655.
46 Id.
47 Professor James Brooks observes that public fear of' violent crile in America is
wholly out of proportion considering the statistical likelihood that an individual will in
fact be victimized by a violent crime. Brooks attributes this "irrational'
fear to "the
mass inedia's lurid portrayal of the victilm of crime," which promotes a " 'Next time it
iiight be Ie' "',reaction, regardless of the probability that such victimization will ever
occur. Brooks, The Fear of Crime in the United States, 20 CRIME & DELIN. 241, 241-42
(1974).
48 Jordan, supra note 12. T'he author states:
I can think of few issues in American life more distorted b mth, more
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means to arrive at its remedy. 49
Mandatory imprisonment proposals have been vehemently opposed on a number of grounds. Such provisions clearly deny sentencing judges the flexibility to consider mitigating circumstances and individual attributes which might militate in favor of the grant of
probation. 5 0 A denial of discretion manifests a distrust in the ability of

"those who administer the system [of criminal justice] on a day-to-day
basis" to distinguish those offenders who warrant severe punishment
from those who do not."1 This is particularly enigmatic in light of the
wide discretion vested in these same individuals to mete out protracted sentences, aggregate consecutive sentences, 5

2

and extend sen-

offenders." 5 3

tences for "special dangerous
To grant sentencing judges
the freedom to punish with severity but not with lenity strikes at the
essential fairness of our system of criminal justice. It is the position of
the American Law Institute that
[h]owever right it may be to take the gravest view of an offense in
general, there will be cases comprehended in the definition where
the circumstances were so unusual, or the mitigations so extreme,
that a suspended sentence or probation would be proper. We see
no reason to distrust the courts upon this matter or to fear that
such authority will be abused.54
A principal rationale underlying the cry for mandatory prison
inflamed by popular passion, and more cynically used for personal and political
gain than the issue of crime and what to do about it.
I have just flown here from a city, New York, where some maayoraltv candidates are conducting campaigns of alarm and exaggeration, skillfully manipulating public fear of crime in the streets in the hopes that exploitation of the issue
will bring them votes.
Id. at 233.
49 Id. at 233 (editorial introduction). The thrust of the author's argument is aptly
summed up: "Crime is a much misunderstood issue . . . and its politicization impedes
remedies." Id.
50 The flexibility of a judge to consider the individual attributes of an oflender is an
essential element of a penological philosophy that punishment should fit the offender,
not the offense. The Supreme Court has recognized this philosophy and has noted the
wide acceptance of probation "as a wise policy." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248 (1949) (footnote omitted). The ACLU is of the opinion that mandatory sentence provisions "implicitly tell the judge that probation is not preferred, but a last resort to be
accorded only the criminal offender who is an extraordinarily good risk." Hearings,
supra note 2, at 7975 (Statement of Mary Ellen Gale, Staff Counsel of the ACLU) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Statement Re: S. 1400].
51 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 1253.

See S. 1 § 2304. See generally notes 81-95 infra and accompanying text.
53 See S. 1 § 2302(b). See generally notes 96-151 infra and accompanying text.
52

54 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02, Comment 3(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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sentences is that certainty of punishment will serve as an effective
deterrent to crime. 55 Practical considerations, however, challenge the
validity of this premise. Clearly, the deterrent effect of mandatory
sentences will not exceed that of discretionary sentences unless po-

tential offenders are fully appreciative of the distinction between the
two. Yet, it is unlikely that a potential felon would consult penal statutes before embarking on his criminal scheme.56
Furthermore, there is significant doubt whether mandatory sentences will, in fact, eradicate the exercise of discretion in sentencing by judges. Mandatory sentences do not affect the discretionary
power to acquit nohvithstanding an\ verdict of guilt-a power fre-

quently exercised where a judge fears that the imposition of a mandatory prison sentence would be unjust. 57 In addition, mandatory
sentences, while restricting the flexibility of the sentencing judge,
only serve to shift sentencing discretion to the prosecuting attorneys
who determine which charges will be brought against a defendant. 5
The Brown Commission has ,vell noted that prosecuting authorities, once armed with mandatory sentences, have used such sentences manipulatively to deprive certain defendants of their constitutional rights. For example, mandatory sentences have been used to
erode both fifth and sixth amendment rights within the context of the
plea bargaining process. The Commission observed that
[i]n both Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, offenders are
typically charged both with a "hard count," that is, one that carries
,5 On June 19, 1975, President Ford advised the Congress: "Reasonable
minimum sentences can restore the sense of certainty of' imprisonment upon
deterrent impact of criminal aw is hased." Mssege no Crime. snulra note
56 Criminologists Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins suggest that

mandatory
which the
2, at 656.
four prerequisite aspects of public knowledge must exist before threats of punishment can deter
crime: (1) it must be known that a particular act is prohibited; (2) it must be known that
those who engage in the prohibited act might be punished; (3) for severe penalties to
deter crime, degrees of severit' of potential punishment must be known; and (4) in
order that increased rates of detection deter, such probability of being caught must be
known. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 142 (1973).
51 Professor Newman thus explains this tendency:
Acquittal of defendants in spite of evidence sufficient to convict is a cominon practice. Many but by no means all of such acquittals involve cases of
minor infractions of the law. Acquittal is used by the judge in some instances to
free defendants who would, in his opinion, be excessively harmed by the criminal record or the mandatory sentence following conviction.
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 131 (1966). See generally!id. at 131-72.
Nor is this power to "acquit" the guilty limited to the judicial branch: The pardoning power is the traditional prerogative of the executive branch of governmnent. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 2,
1.
58 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 1254; ACLU Statement Re: S. 1400, supra
note 50, at 7974.
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a mandatory sentence of at least 5 years and which denies both
parole and probation consideration, and a "soft count," that is, one

which normally requires a sentence of at least 2 years if prison is
chosen as the sentence, but which does permit both probation and
parole. If the offender pleads guilty, as most do, it is routine to
dismiss the hard count and accept the plea to the soft one. 5 9

It is difficult to see how guilty pleas, so coerced, may be considered
to be voluntary. The A.C.L.U. finds such a practice to be "chilling"
to a defendant's "Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, and [his]
Fifth Amendment right to plead not guiltx;."60 The Brown Commission also noted that mandatory sentences have also been used to
coerce defendants into turning state's evidence. In such cases
[t]he defendant is orginally [sic] charged only with the hard count,
and told that if he will cooperate by turning informer, he will be
reindicted and permitted to plead guilty to a lesser count included
in the superseding indictment. 61

Mtandatory prison sentences, then, should be deleted from S. 1
because they fall short of their pronounced aim-to deter crime.
The- serve to redirect sentencing discretion now held by judges to
prosecuting attorneys who engage in practices which subvert the
rights of offenders. Moreover, mandatory sentences represent a simplistic and politically expedient approach to attacking the problem of'
crime, a problem which plainly requires a more thoughtful approach.
In cases where no mandatory prison sentence is applicable, S. 1
authorizes a sentencing judge to order, in his discretion, a term of'
probation:
[A]uthorized terms of probation are:
(1) for a felony, not less than one nor more than five years:
(2) for a misdemeanor, not more than two years;
(3) for an infraction, not more than one year.62

\What is unfortunate, however, is that the criteria

pro\i(led

by S. 1 to

be considered by the court in determining the propriety of probation
clearlh lean toward establishing a legislative policy restricting the
grant of probation. 6 3 These criteria, which appear repeatedly
59 WORKING PAPERS, Sl.pro note 5, at 1254.
60

ACLU Statement Re: S. 1400, .supra note 50, at 7974.

61 \VORKING PAPERS, 81111t0 note 5, at 1254.

62 S. 1 § 2101(h).
63

Id. § 2102(a) mandates:

The court, in determining whether to im)ose a term of probation, and in determining the length of the term and the conditions of prol)ation, shall consider:
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throughout S. I's sentencing provisions, 64 "[point] towards the 'need'
for imprisonment for retributive or deterrent purposes. "65
Attitudes toward probation may be roughly drawn into two
philosophical positions. The first position, advocated by "many in the
criminal justice system," is "that imprisonment is the best sentence
for crime unless particular reasons exist for 'mitigating' the
sentence. "66 S. 1 would appear to reflect this premise. The countervailing position is "that the automatic response in a sentencing situation ought to be probation, unless particular aggravating factors
emerge in the case at hand. "67 Itis strongly urged that the presumption favoring probation is the more enlightened approach to criminal
corrections, and that S. I's provisions relating to probation are therefore unacceptable.
"The irrational clich6, that probation means 'coddling' or 'soft'
treatment, is now on the junk heap of discarded notions. "68 Probation
is an important correctional device whose value derives from its
benefiting society at large, as well as the individual defendant.69 The
ABA has said of probation:
(i) [1]t maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the
same time vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further violations of law;
(ii) it affirnatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender
by continuing normal community contacts;
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of

64
65

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; and
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner.
Compare id.with id. §§ 2202(a), 2302(a).
Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 17 CRIM. L. REP. 3203, 3204

(1975).
66 ABA PROJECT

ON

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

JUSTICE,

STANDARDS

RELATING

386 (1974). The ABA Project noted that

this feeling "is not a sound starting point in the framing of criminal sanctions." id.
67 Id.
" Herlands, When and How Should a Sentencing Judge Use Probation, 35 F.R.D.
487, 488 (1964).
69

ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 386

(1974).
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confinement which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the
reintegration of the offender into the comnunity;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial cost to the public treasury
of an effective correctional system; [and]
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent
70
dependents of the offender.
Probation also prevents the casting of the voung or first-time offender
into the prison environment where his criminal education and antisocial inclinations will be fostered. It is the ABA's opinion that "the
starting point for every sentence should be probation or some other
sentence not involving commitment," and that confinement should be
grounded only on some specific affirmative reason.71 The American
Law Institute holds similar beliefs. 72
Also in accord with these views was the Brown Commission report which focused on two practical considerations in concluding that
probation should be "presuiptively ...
appropriate. 7 The report
first noted that removal of the offender fiom the society in which he
was expected to live operated against his learning skills necessary to
successfully live in a social environment.7 4 As such, "where the defendant does not pose a significant public danger," probation was to
be the suitable disposition unless there were a "particular rehabilitative reason" justifying imprisonment, or if probation would "unduly
5
depreciate the seriousness of the offense.'7
Secondly, it was observed that the cost of incarcerating federal
offenders is in excess of ten times the amount required to place an
offender on probation. Furthermore, the figures relied upon by the
Commission did not take into account the additional costs of building
penal institutions, the "intangible costs" of relief paid to the families
of' inmates who were without other means of support, or the wages
the inmate could earn were he on probation and working. 76
70
71

Id.

at 394.
ABA PROJECT ON

MINIMUM STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 72 (Approved Draft 1968).
72 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (1962), regarding criteria for the imposition of probation rather than imprisonment, states in part:
The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and

circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is necessary for protection of

the public ....
'3 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 1268.
74 Id.
75
76

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1268-69.
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Upon such considerations, the Commission recommended that a
court when imposing punishment "should begin its thinking on the
assumption that probation should be the sentence." A departure from
this assumption should be considered only -when "factors in the case
77
[would] appear to indicate the propriety of some other sanction."'
The Commission's director, Professor Louis B. Schwartz, was quick to
note that the purpose of the Commission's position was not to eliminate the judge's option to impose a prison term, "but to require him
to think about the alternative of' probation, and to prefer fireedom. "78
S. 1 disregards the progressive and enlightened approach recommended by the Brown Commission, the American Bar Association,
and the American Law Institute. Nowhere does it place suitable emphasis on the positive qualities of probation. It does not require federal sentencing judges to consider the propriety of probation before
imposing a harsher sentence. Furthermore, S. 1 precludes firom appellate review the refusal of a judge to grant probation, except -,\here
he imposes a prison sentence long enough to enable the defendant to
qualify for an appeal under section 3725.79 Without the right of appeal, there is no way in which an offender may ensure that he has not
been denied probation arbitrarilxy. The S. 1 approach does little more
than encourage the storage of human beings. Penological experience
has demonstrated the unlikelihood that imprisonment serves any sort
of rehabilitative purpose.80 Since the rehabilitative value of imprisonment has vet to be demonstrated, the "storage of offenders" approach to corrections embodied in S. 1 is without justification. This
policy can only result in persistently high crime rates and excessive
penal system costs.
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING

Under S. 1, the authority to impose cumulative sentences represents an opportunity fbr the exercise of arbitrary discretion. If the
primary considerations in determining sentences are the character of
the offender, his potential danger to the public, and a reduction of

11 Id. at 1300.
"I Schwartz, supra note 7, at 3266.
79 Under S. I § 3725, a felon sentenced to less than one-fifth of the maximum authorized term of imprisonment for the crime of which he was convicted is precluded
from seeking appellate review of his sentence. A misdemeanant is denied any opportun-

ity to appeal his sentence. See generally notes 188-243 infra and accompanying text.
80 David Gilnan, Counsel to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
states: "Since prisons do not and, in m\ view, cannot rehabilitate offenders, rehabilitation cannot be justified as a purpose or goal of a prison sentence." Gilman, SentencingInprisonment Consequences, 11 CrM. L. BULL. 318, 321 (1975).
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the probability of future antisocial behavior, then great restraint
should be exercised over the practice of cumulating penalties for the
several oflnses assignable to a single criminal event. S. 1 may well
fail to restrain this practice adequately. Restraints on cumulative
punishment have been established by the Supreme Court through a
rule of statutory construction which obligates a court to resolve with
lenience any legislative ambiguity as to what constitutes a " 'unit of
prosecution' " for the purpose of sentencing. 8 1 Thus, a particular
transaction may be subdivided into multiple offenses only where
Congress expresses its intent "to make each stick in a faggot a single
criminal unit. '"82 Otherwise, courts must honor the "presupposition of
our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against
the imposition of a harsher punishment. "83
Nonetheless, in areas where a congressional will "to turn the
screw of the criminal machinery-detection, prosecution and punishment-tighter and tighter" on a particular activity is discerned, the
Court has not objected to consecutive sentencing. 84 In effect, the
utilization of consecutive sentencing is dependent upon a court's
ability to perceive legislative authorization to apply such a procedure
where given criminal activities are involved. The adoption of S. 1 will
serve as a sufficient legislative mandate for the expansion of the practice of cumulative punishment in a broad range of criminal activity.
Section 2304 of S. 1 explicitly authorizes a court to order multiple terms of imprisonment to run consecutively in cases where the
terms are imposed simultaneously or in cases where a term is imposed on someone already subject to an unserved sentence. 85 The
1i Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). In Bell, the accused pleaded guilty
to violations of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970). The violations consisted of the
interstate transportation of two different women for immoral purposes on the same occasion. 349 U.S. at 82. Consequently, the Court addressed the issue of whether the transportation of two different women constituted separable units of prosecution. Finding no
unambiguous expression of Congress' will to the contrary, the Court found that the
single transaction in question could not be divided into multiple offenses. Id. at 83-84.
82 Id. at 83.
83 Id.
84 Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 (1958). Here, the Court found narcotics
to be such an area, as it upheld consecutive sentencing of the accused for three separate
violations stemming from a single sale of heroin and cocaine. Consecutive sentences
were imposed upon the accused for violations of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4704(a),
4705(a), and of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1970). 357
U.S. at 387. In reviewing the statutes in question, the Court found that Congress had
intentionally created three separate offenses at different times. Consequently, a Congressional intention to deal strictly with the narcotics area was found to exist, and no

room for a rule of lenity could be allowed. Id. at 391.
85 S. 1 § 2304(a) provides in part:
If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same
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accumulation of penalties is only limited to the extent that the sum
total of the aggregate of consecutive terms may not exceed the maximum authorized terms "for an offense one grade higher than the
most serious offense of which [the offender] was found guilty. "'86 This
provision grants inordinate discretion to sentencing authorities which
may be employed in any case where a legislative "crack-down" may
be construed. The threat to personal liberties becomes immediately
apparent. The conviction for inciting members of the armed forces to
refusal of duty during time of war, for example, becomes punishable
for up to 30 years in prison, if such activity is compounded by other
87
offenses.
The criteria imposed by S. 1 on courts for determining whether
consecutive or concurrent sentences should be imposed are the same
harsh criteria used in determining the lengths of sentences and the
appropriateness of probation . 8 These criteria, which include "the
need . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense" and "to promote
respect for law," 89 fail sufficiently to restrain federal courts from aggregating sentences to the point of injustice.
It is the ABA's position that "[c]onsecutive sentences are rarely
appropriate. "90 Such sentences could be justified in cases involving
habitual offenders because of the risk such offenders pose to the public. Yet, the "special dangerous offender" provisions of S. 191 would
time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already
subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms run concurrently
unless the court orders that the terms are to run consecutively.
86 Id.§ 2304(b).
87 The crime of inciting members of the armed forces to refusal of duty is graded as
a Class C felony whcre the criminal conduct is in time of war or where the member

being incited is, or is about to be, engaged in combat. Id. §§ 1117(a)(1), (b)(1). The
maximum authorized term of imprisonment for a Class B felony, the next grade above
Class C felonies, is thirty years. Id. § 2301(b)(2). Thus, under section 2304(b) it is conceivable that a defendant charged with this crime might receive a thirty-year sentence if
related offenses were also committed at the same time. For example, a speaker in a
single speech might incite one listener to refusal of duty and another listener, being a
current member of the armed forces, to desertion. If these crimes were committed in
time of war both would be Class C felonies, each punishable with fifteen-year sentences. See id. §§ 1117(b)(1), 2301(b)(3). Consequently, these sentences could be cumulated to equal the thirty-year maximum sentence authorized by section 2304(b).
88 Compare id. § 2304(a) (criteria for multiple-sentence aggregation) with id.
§ 2102(a) (criteria for probation) and id. § 2 3 02 (a) (criteria for length of sentence).
89 Id. § 2304(a)(2)(A).
90 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES

AND PROCEDURES

§ 3.4(b) (Approved Draft

1968).
91 S. 1 § 2301(c). Sentences may be doubled, but a sentence in excess of twenty-five
years may not be imposed by this process. Where the sentence as doubled would exceed twenty-five years, the maximum authorized term, as extended, is twenty-five years.
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seem adequate enough protection for the public to make the liberal
use of consecutive sentencing a form of "overkill."
It must be noted, in addition, that section 1823(b) of S. 1 overrides the discretion-granting provisions of section 2304 by compelling
the imposition of consecutive sentences for second offenders who use
a firearm during the commission of a crime. 92 This provision also bars
probation in such cases. 93 The effect of section 1823(b) is utterly to
abolish, in this instance, the opportunity of the sentencing judge to
consider, on the basis of individual circumstances involved in a given
case, any disposition other than incarceration.
The harshness of the S. 1 approach to consecutive sentencing is
highlighted by comparison with the recommendations of the Brown
Commission. That study group believed that "the imposition of a consecutive sentence" should be treated as "an unusual measure"--one
that should be used where the court would be "required to give
reasons, and to conclude that the case is of an exceptional nature.- 94
In its final report, the Commission suggested that consecutive sentencing be barred altogether where
(a) one offense is an included offense of the other;
(b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation or other form of preparation to commit, or facilitation of, the
other; or
(c) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a
designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a
"
specific instance of such conduct. 5
S. 1 is wholly remiss in its failure to include similar restraints on
the practice of cumulative sentencing. Judicial discretion to aggregate
sentences should be statutorily limited to only those truly exceptional
cases where the protection of the public requires the long-tern sequestration of an offender. Under no circumstances should consecutive sentencing be mandatory.
For a more extensive discussion of this aspect of S. 1 see notes 96-152 infra and accompanying text.
92 S. I § 1823(b) expressly provides that
notwithstanding the provisions of section 2304(a) and (b), such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively with any other term of imprisonment imposed
upon the defendant.
93

ld.

94 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 1323.
95 BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, § 3204(2). Contrast this with S. 1
§ 1002: In S. l's definition and grading of the offense of criminal conspiracy, no restraint is placed upon the practice of cumulating a sentence for the conspiracy offense
with a sentence for the underlying substantive offense. See Crystal, supra note 11, at
648.
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DANGEROUS SPECIAL OFFENDERS

S. 1, by retaining the dangerous special offender provisions of
Title X of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act, 9 6 continues a sentencing concept that has proved to be both cumbersome and, procedurally, of doubtful constitutionality. Section 2302(b) provides that
a court may impose an "extended sentence" on a defendant convicted
of a felony and found to be a "dangerous special offender." 9 7 The
extended sentence can be up to twice the term authorized under the
sentencing provisions of section 2301(b) 98 for the underlying felony,
or twentv-five years, whichever is less." 99
The procedure for determining whether the defendant is a
dangerous special offender is set out in a proposed amendment to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 10 0 The new rules would provide for pretrial notice by the government attorney at a "reasonable
96 Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. X, 84 Stat. 948 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3575 et seq.
(1970)).
Three overlapping provisions of S. 1 relating to dangerous special offender sentencing must be read together. Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 provides for pretrial notice to
the defendant of the Government's belief that he is a dangerous special offender, a
posttrial hearing on the Government's allegation by a judge sitting without a jury, and
certain other "due process" safeguards. Section 2302(b) sets out the criteria under
which the defendant may be adjudged a dangerous special offender. Section 2 3 01(c)
provides for the extended terms of imprisonment, based on the terms allowed for the
"underlying felony" under the sentencing provisions of § 2301(b).
97 S. 1 § 2302(b) provides in part:
The court, after the hearing required by Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, shall impose an extended term of imprisonment, within
the range authorized by section 2301(c), if it finds that the defendant is a
dangerous special offender, and that, considering the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, such an extended term is warranted to protect the public from further crinies uf h dfendant.
For the text of S. l's definitions of a "dangerous special offender" see notes 105-07
infra.
98 S. 1 § 2301(b) authorizes terms of imprisonment of up to three, seven, fifteen,
thirty years, and life for Class E, D, C, B and A felonies, respectively.
99 Id. § 2301(c).
oo Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1. The proposed rule reads:
Sentence of a Dangerous Special Offender
(a) PRETRIAL NOTICE.-If the attorney for the government has reason to
believe that a defendant charged with a felony is a dangerous special offender
as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2302(b), he may sign and file with the court, a reasonable time before trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, a notice:
(1) alleging that the defendant is a dangerous special offender who,
upon conviction for such felony, is subject to the imposition of an extended
term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 2301(c) and 2302(b); and
(2) setting forth with particularity the reasons for his belief that the
defendant is a dangerous special offender.
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time before trial" or before defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere, stating "with particularity the reasons for his belief that the
defendant is a dangerous special offender."'' 1 At a hearing after the
defendant's trial or plea, "the court sitting without a jury" determines
if the defendant is a dangerous special offender by a "preponderance
of the information. "102 Both the Government and the defendant are
entitled to counsel, compulsory process, and cross-examination of

witnesses at the hearing. 103

The criteria for determining whether a defendant is a dangerous
special offender, and thus subject to enhanced sentencing, are twofold. First, the court must determine whether an extended term would
be necessary "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.' x0 4 Second, the court must adjudge the defendant a dangerous
special offender under any one of three broad classes of definition:
First, a defendant previously convicted of two or more felonies
may be deemed a dangerous special offender if he has been imprisoned, and, within the ten years preceding the commission of the offense Linder consideration he has been in prison, placed on probation,
or released on parole upon conviction for one or more of those

felonies. 105
In no case shall the fact that the defendant is alleged to be such an offender be
disclosed to the jury. If the court finds that the filing of the notice as a public
record may prejudice fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, the notice
shall be sealed by the court and shall not be filed as a public record, produced
under subpoena, or otherwise made public during the pendency of the criminal
matter, except on order of the court, but shall be subject to inspection by the
defendant who is alleged to be a dangerous special offender or by his counsel.
(b) HEAIUNG.-After a defendant alleged to be a dangerous special offender
is found guilty or enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and before sentence is imposed, the court shall fix a time for, and shall hold, a hearing to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced as a dangerous special
offender. The hearing shall be held before the court sitting without a jury, and
the defendant and the government shall be entitled to assistance of counsel,
compulsory process, and cross-examination of such witnesses as appear at the
hearing. If it appears by a preponderance of the information, including information submitted during the trial, during the sentencing hearing, and in so much
of the presentence report as the court relies on, that the defendant is a dangerous special offender and that a sentence as a dangerous special offender is warranted to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, the court shall
sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2301(c)
and 2302(b). The court shall place in the record its findings, including an identification of the information relied upon in making its findings.
101Id.
102
103

Id.
Id.

104 S. 1 § 2302(b). The court must take into account "the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant." Id.
105 Id. § 2302(b)(1). A defendant is deemed to be a dangerous special offender when
he has previously been convicted of two or more felonies committed on differ-
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Second, if the current felony was committed "as part of a pattern
of criminal conduct" and the defendant either "derived a substantial
portion of his income" from it or demonstrated "special skill or expertise" in the crime, he can be classified a dangerous special
06
offender. 1
Finally, a defendant who "masterminds" a conspiracy is a
dangerous special offender if the felony for which he is convicted was
0 7
part of a widespread "pattern of criminal conduct."'1
The standards and methods set out in S. 1 for determining
whether or not a defendant shall be imprisoned for an extended term
are substantially identical to those in the current dangerous special
offender statute.10 8 The purpose of the 1970 Organized Crime Conent occasions; one or more of such felonies resulted in his being in imprisonment prior to the commission of the current offense; one or more of such
felonies was committed within, or resulted in his being in imprisonment or on
probation or parole within, ten years of the commission of the current offense;
and no such felony was charged to be a basis for increasing the grading of the
current offense tinder section 1811 (Trafficking in an Opiate), 1812 (Trafficking
in Drugs), 1813 (Possessing Drugs), 1814 (\Violating a Drug Regulation), or 1823
(Using a Weapon in the Course of a Crime).

Id.

Joe

Id. § 2302(b)(2). This independent definition requires that a defendant have
committed the current felony as part of a pattern of criminal conduct from
which he derived a substantial portion of his income, or in which he manifested special skill or expertise-such as unusual knowledge, judgment, ability,
or manual dexterity-in facilitating the initiation, organizing, planning, financing, direction, management, supervision, execution, or concealment of criminal
conduct, the enlistment of accomplices in such conduct, the avoidance of detection or apprehension of such conduct, or the disposition of the fruits or proceeds of such conduct.

Id.
107 Id. § 2302(b)(3) requires that

the current felony constitutes, or was committed in furtherance of, a conspiracy
with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of criminal conduct; the
current felony was not charged to be an offense, or an attempt or conspiracy to
commit an offense, under section 1801 (Operating a Racketeering Syndicate) or
1802 (Racketeering) or 1803 (Washing Racketeering Proceeds); and he initiated,
organized, planned, financed, directed, managed, or supervised, all or part of
such conspiracy or conduct, or agreed to do so, or gave or received a bribe or
used force in the course of such conduct.
1o Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) ivith S. 1 §§ 2 3 01(c), 2302(b) and Proposed
Fed. R. Criin. P. 32.1.
Certain significant differences between S. 1 and Title X do exist, however. S. 1
provides a more specific guideline for determining the duration of the extended sentence. S. 1 §§ 2301(b), (c) permit an extended sentence not to exceed twice the maximum term for the underlying felony. See note 98 supra. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b)
(1970), which permits the judge to sentence a dangerous special offender "for an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionatein severity to
the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.'" (Emphasis added.)
The "habitual offender" provisions of both S. 1 and the current code require that an
offender must have served a term of imprisonment as a result of a prior conviction

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 33

trol Act was to provide the Government with new weapons in dealing
with organized crime.I 0 9 Title X of the Act, permitting extended sentences for dangerous special offenders, was conceived primarily as a
means of increasing the relatively short sentences meted out to organized crime figures." 0 However, the provisions for enhanced sentencing were not limited to organized crime offenders. Title X provided extended sentences for three categories of dangerous special
offenders: habitual offenders, professional criminals, as well as organized crime offenders."'
The constitutionality of Title X was questioned by legal
scholars,"1 2 bar associations, 113 and representatives of the American
before the offender may be liable for a subsequent "extended" term. Further, both
specify that the current offense must have been committed within a specified time from
the defendant's release from imprisonment, probation, or parole under any previous
conviction. However, under 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1970), a defendant qualifies as a
dangerous special offender under this criterion if, inter alia, he commits a subsequent
offense "less than five years" after release from prior confinement. S. 1 § 2302(b)(1)
doubles to ten years the period of potential vulnerability.
109 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23
(Statement of Findings and Purpose).
110115 CONG. REC. 34389 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan). Senator McClellan, a co-sponsor of the Act, introduced into the record statistical data provided by the
Justice Department and the FBI indicating that most sentences of imprisonment meted
out to "identified members of La Cosa Nostra" ranged from only 40% to 50% of the
possible maximums under the law. Further, in two-thirds of these indictments, the maximum sentence would have been only five years or less. Id. at 34390. The Justice
Department's Memorandum Embodying Results of Staff Studies stated that
[i]t was in part on the basis of this data, therefore, that we reached the
conclusion that the existing range of penalties in most organized crime prosecutions is not adequate to achieve the minimum goal of incapacitation. Consequently, the provisions of [the original bill] were drafted to embody a special
term, providing for a sentence of up to 30 years on a showing of special circumstances of aggravation in the commission of an individual felony.
Id. But see id. at 34390 n.1, which indicates that the Justice Department recognized the
potential for applying the dangerous special offender concept to all recidivists as a
means of "reducing the high rate of general crime."
11 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts proposed an
amendment to the original Senate bill that would have limited the application of the
dangerous special offender provision to persons convicted of certain organized crime
offenses. 116 CONG. REc. 845 (1970). A list of offenses to which his amendment would
have limited dangerous special offender sentencing was set out. Id. at 848. In debate
with Senator McClellan, one of the bill's sponsors, Senator Kennedy expressed concern
that Title X could be applied to enhance the sentences of "political" defendants such as
those in the "Chicago 7" conspiracy trial, or could be utilized in prosecutions such as
those of Dr. Benjamin Spock and Rev. Sloan Coffin for conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act. Id. at 845-48. The proposed amendment was defeated. Id. at 849.
112See, e.g., Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861,
S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 184-213 (1969) (Statement
of Peter W. Low, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
11 "We think that it is unlikely that the proposed procedures would pass constitu-
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Civil Liberties Union 1 1 4 at the time it was proposed and in conmen115
tary -afterit was enacted into law.
In Senate hearings on S. l's immediate predecessor, S. 1400, the
Department of Justice itself described enhanced sentencing schemes
similar to those in Title X and S. 1 as "unworkable" and "impractical," pointing out that the state habitual offender statutes upon which
the enhanced sentencing statutes are based have been generally disregarded by prosecutors because of procedural difficulties and, in
116
many instances, have been circumvented by plea bargaining.
The Government has thus far attempted to utilize Title X's enhanced sentencing procedures in only a few cases. United States v.
Bertolio117 was apparently the first case in which such a sentence
tional muster." Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, The Proposed Organized Crime Control Act of 1960 (S. 30), reprinted
in Hearings on S. 30 and related proposals Before Subcomin. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 291, 333 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings on S. 30].
The New York County Lawyers Association pointed out the failure of existing state
multiple-offender statutes to curb recidivism and concluded:
The provisions of Title X which would authorize greater sentences for
"professional" and "organized crime" offenders run afoul of the American distaste for "crimes or [sic] status" which punish a person for what he is rather
than for what he is proved to have done. We believe that this is dangerously
subject to abuse ....
House Hearings on S. 30, supra at 403 (Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation
of the New York County Lawyers' Association on S. 30) (emphasis in original).
See also Letter from Bradley T. Jones, President, Seattle-King County Bar Association, to Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Aug. 4,
1970, reprinted in House Hearings on S. 30, supra at 681-82.
114 Lawrence Speiser, Director of the ACiLU'
Washington office, stated:
The sentencing procedure [of S. 30, Title X1 especially with respect to those
caught under the "pattern of criminal conduct" portion of Title X, is in effect a
substitute for a criminal trial at which the government would be forced to prove
its suspicions beyond a reasonable doubt and in accordance with wellstructured procedural due process. It is this basic fact which leads us to the
conclusion that the entire procedure suffers from constitutional defects which
go far beyond the vagueness of the definition.
House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 113, at 501.
115 See, e.g., Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
546 (1971). This Note examined the entire Act exhaustively.
116Hearings, supra note 2, at 8047-48 (Statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). The Department believed such provisions to be "unnecessary given adequately flexible sentencing levels."
Id. at 8047.
11716 CRim. L. REP. 2545 (W.D. Ky. 1973). The court rejected constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) premised on the denial of jury trial and failure to
assure the defendant the opportunity to confront his accusers. The court also rejected
claims that the statute constituted an ex post facto law or bill of attainder and that the
statute violated fifth amendment due process and equal protection. 16 CsIM. L. REP. at
2545.
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actually was imposed.' 1 8 Two other attempts by the Government to
use Title X were thwarted on procedural grounds. 11 9 The constitutionality of Title X was the major issue in two remaining cases.
In United States v. Duardi 2 0° the statute was successfully attacked on constitutional grounds. The court found initially that the
statute's "dangerousness" standard-which requires a finding by the
judge that a longer sentence is appropriate to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant 12 1-is "so unduly vague and uncertain
that it violates due process."122
Alternatively, the Duardi court found Title X procedurally unconstitutional because it read the statute to permit the imposition of
an additional sentence grounded on a finding of fact (i.e., that the
118
See

16 Cria. L. REP. at 2545. Bertolio appealed his sentence, but the appeal was
dismissed as moot by the Sixth Circuit following his killing in an alleged robbery attempt after he had been released from custody due to a clerical error. Id.
119 In United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Fla. 1974), the Government attempted to apply the enhanced sentencing statute after multiple defendants
in a conspiracy prosecution had been found guilty. The Government first announced
its intention to do so in front of the presiding judge in open court, then filed a written
motion. The court held that the motion was not timely, citing that portion of the statute
'a reasonable time before trial or
which states that such notice must be filed within
acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.' " Id. at 618, 621 (quoting
from 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970) (emphasis by the court)).
In United States v. Kelly, 384 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1974), the Government filed
a notice invoking the "habitual offender" extended sentence provision and alleging that
extended confinement was necessary "to protect the public from further criminal conduct" of the defendant. Id. at 1397. The court found that the Government's notice was
insufficient because it failed to state "with particularity" the reasons why the prosecutor
believed the defendant to be "dangerous" within the statute's definition. Id. at 1399.
Defendant's motion to strike the Government's notice was sustained. Id. at 1401. See
also id. at 1397 n.1, where the court expressly reached "no opinion as to the substantive
constitutional questions raised concerning the remainder of Section 3575."
120 384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974). In Duardi, the defendant successfully assailed the adequacy of the Government's notice asking for an extended sentence on
purely statutory grounds. The court was then faced with the question of whether to
allow the Government-after trial-to amend its notice to comply with the statute. Such
an amendment, recognized the court, could be denied on an interpretation of statutory
language. However, apparently because of the prosecution's desire for a broader consideration of the issue, the court proceeded to give an expansive alternative constitutional disposition of the validity of the statute. Id. at 879.
121 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1970).
122 384 F. Supp. at 885. The Duardi court cited Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939), in which the Court considered the validity of a New Jersey statute making a
person found to be a " 'gangster' " liable for criminal penalties of up to 20 years. Id. at
452. The statute was held unconstitutional because
the terms it employs to indicate what it purports to denounce are so vague,
indefinite and uncertain that it must be condemned as repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 458.
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defendant is "dangerous") "on the basis of new and separate criminal
charges which could be established by a 'preponderance of the information,' without a jury trial."' 123 In so finding, the court acknowledged the principle set out by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New
York, 124 that a judge in determining an appropriate sentence should
not be limited to consideration of the evidence admitted at trial
alone. Williams concerned the validity of a New York statute allowing
the judge, after the verdict is rendered, to "seek any information that
will aid the court in determining the proper treatment of [the]
defendant. '"125 In upholding the statute the Court emphasized that
such wide discretion is granted to a sentencing judge only after the
issue of guilt has been resolved within the strictures of the approto
priate procedural safeguards necessary to "confine the trial contest 126
charged."
offense
particular
the
to
relevant
strictly
is
that
evidence
The particular sentence imposed in Williams was within the range of
penalties provided for the offense of which the defendant was found
guilty in a jury trial. 127 It did not involve the application of a greater
range of penalties, imposed upon a separate factual determination by
the trial judge after the verdict of the jury, as is the case with Title X
and S. 1.
Duardi found that Title X's provisions were comparable to the
enhanced sentencing procedure at issue in Specht v.Patterson.128 In
Specht, the Supreme Court reviewed a Colorado statute which allowed a defendant convicted of "indecent liberties" under one statute
(with a possible ten-year maximum sentence), to be sentenced under
a second statute to an indeterminate term ranging from one day to
life, if the judge determined that the defendant " 'if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to mei'Deis of t.

public, or isAn ha-

123384 F. Supp. at 883. The "new and separate criminal charges" in Duardi
included allegations that the multiple defendants had been involved in an attempted
murder, a crime for which they had not been elsewhere tried or convicted. Id. at
877-78, 881.
124337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see 384 F. Supp. at 883-84.
125337 U.S. at 243 (quoting from Law of Mar. 26, 1927, ch. 327, [1927] N.Y. Laws
784, as amended, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 390.30 (McKinney 1971)). The trial judge
had relied on a consideration of the defendant's past criminal record, a probation department report and on "information obtained . .. through other sources." 337 U.S. at
242. The judge imposed the death penalty over a jury recommendation of life imprisonment. Id.
126337 U.S. at 246-47.
127See id. at 242 & n.2. The Court noted that modern approaches to criminal
punishment give the judge great discretion in determining an appropriate sentence,
based on the individual characteristics of the defendant and not merely the nature of
the crime. Id. at 247.
128386 U.S. 605 (1967); see 384 F. Supp. at 884.
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bitual offender and mentally ill.' "129 The statute permitted a determination of this issue without providing the defendant a
hearing. 130 The Specht Court recognized the "wide discretion" principle set out in Williams, but refused to apply it in an enhanced sentencing procedure where the judge must make "a new finding of fact
that was not an ingredient of the offense charged.- 1 3 1 Specht
relied on previous decisions of the Supreme Court which held that a
defendant has a right to due process safeguards where eligibility for
an extended sentence "is 'a distinct issue.' "132 In two cases discussed
by Specht, various safeguards were mandated where the sentencing
procedures involved a separate factual determination-made subsequent to the verdict on the underlying offense-that the defendant
had a prior record of criminal convictions.1 33 The Specht Court also
relied upon a third case, United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,' 3 4 in which the Third Circuit held that where a defendant is
liable for an extended sentence upon a finding that he would "if at
large, constitute a threat of bodily harm to members of the public or
is an habitual offender and mentally ill," 13 5 the defendant is "entitled
to a full judicial hearing."136
The due process safeguards enumerated in Specht are the right
to a hearing and the assistance of counsel, the right to cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses, the right to offer evidence
129 386 U.S. at 607 (quoting from Law of April 1, 1953, ch. 89, [1953] Colo. Laws
249, as amended, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-11(2) (Supp. 1969)).
130 386 U.S. at 607.
131 Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
132 Id. at 610 (quoting from Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 625 (1912)).
133 At issue in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) and Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962) were state recidivist statutes which provided, either expressly or by implication, for a jury determination of factual issues. Chandler held that the defendant to
whom the statute was being applied had a right to a reasonable opportunity to obtain
counsel on the habitual criminal charge, 348 U.S. at 9-10, and that the waiver of the
right to counsel on the underlying offense was not automatically a waiver of the right to
counsel on the recidivist charge. Id. at 9. In Oyler, it was held that the defendant had a
right to reasonable notice of the habitual criminal charge, but that reasonable notice did
not necessarily mean notice prior to trial on the underlying offense. 368 U.S. at 452-53.
134 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
135 Id. at 304 (quoting from PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (1964)).
136 355 F.2d at 312. The court went on to say:
At such a hearing the requirements of due process cannot be satisfied by partial
or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such a proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings.
Id. The Gerchman court emphasized strongly the difference between the procedure
under the extended sentencing statute and ordinary sentencing procedures:
While the trial judge dealt most fairly with the petitioner if the proceeding is
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on one's own behalf, and the requirement that the court make suffi13 7
cient findings "to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed."
Duardi extended Specht, holding that due process also requires a jury
trial' 38 and a reasonable doubt standard of proof 1 39 when the Government in a Title X proceeding seeks to prove criminal acts as a
basis for an additional sentence.
In United States v. Holt, 140 a federal district court held, in direct
contrast to Duardi, that the language of Title X is not "vague and
overbroad"' 141 and that the reasonable doubt standard is not required
42
in a finding of fact under Title X. 1
Duardi and Holt are distinguishable because of the two courts'

disparate views of the nature of the sentence-enhancement process in

considered simply as a sentence for the crime to which he pleaded guilty, on
the independent examination which we are required to make . . . it is clear
beyond doubt that the penal proceeding authorized by the Act is essentially
independent of the conviction which is a prerequisite but subordinate element.
Id. at 310-11 (citations omitted).
137 386 U.S. at 610.
138 384 F. Supp. at 883. In Gerchman the court strongly indicated an inclination to
find that a jury trial is guaranteed in such a proceeding, but expressly withheld decision
on the issue, preferring to rest its decision on the denial of the defendant's right to a
hearing and to cross-examination of witnesses. 355 F.2d at 313-15.
139 384 F. Supp. at 883 (by implication).
140 397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
141Id. at 1399. The court stated that "[a]dmittedly, there can never be a 'litmus
paper test' for whether an offender is or is not a danger to the community." Id. The
court analogized § 3575 to 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970), which permits denial of bail to a
convicted defendant or one accused of a capital offense
;f "the court or jidge has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of
release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to
any other person or to the community.397 F. Supp. at 1399 (quoting from 18 U.S.C. § 3148) (emphasis by the court).
The Holt court claimed that this statute was interpreted without any indication of a
vagueness problem in Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36 (Black, Circuit Justice,
1968). 397 F. Supp. at 1399. Sellers, however, was an application for bail pending appeal by a draft evader. In his decision to grant bail, Justice Black laid great stress on an
interpretation of the "pose a danger" language of section 3148 as referring to the
defendant's potential for physical violence. 89 S. Ct. at 37-38. Finding no such risk of
violence in the case at bar, Justice Black never addressed the constitutionality of the
statute. Indeed, no constitutional issue was raised. In any case, it is clear that the language of Title X (and of S. 1 as well) goes beyond what Justice Black perceived as the
purpose of § 3148 (i.e., to protect the public from violence) in that it aims at protecting
the public from any "further crimes of the defendant." See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1970);
S. 1 § 2302(b). It is questionable whether the constitutionality of Title X-or S. 1-may
be based on a comparison with another statute whose scope has been construed to be
far narrower than that of Title X by a case in which its constitutionality was never
considered.
142 397 F. Supp. at 1399-1400.
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Title X. The court in Holt accepted the Government's characterization of a Title X hearing as an ordinary sentencing procedure, allowing the judge in determining sentence to weigh, by a preponderance
of the information, those factors that "he considers in pronouncing
sentence in any other case."' 143 Duardi rejected this view of the Title
X procedure because the statute permits the Government to bring
information without limitation, on "the background, character, and
conduct" of the defendant, 144 including allegations of crimes and
criminal conduct unproven-and perhaps unprovable-at a trial on
these criminal charges. 145 It would seem that the Duardi position
is the more sensitive to the potential for abuse created by Title Xtype enhanced-sentencing provisions. The almost identical provisions of Title X and S. 1146 are in reality a method of allowing the
Government to circumvent due process safeguards in criminal
prosecutions. 147
For example, S. 1 would allow 1 48 an extended sentence to be
based on information alleging participation in a conspiracy that would
itself constitute a separate criminal offense under other provisions of
S. 1.149 Thus, in a circumstance where the Government felt unsure of
its ability to bring a successful conspiracy prosecution under the usual
rules of evidence and standard of proof, that unproven conspiracy
could in many instances be alleged for the purpose of obtaining an
143 Id. at 1400. The court enumerated a number of factors: "the defendant's past
criminal record, the probation officer's evaluation and recommendation, the seriousness
of the instant offense, the offender's attitude, and others." Id.
144 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970).
145 See 384 F. Supp. at 881-82.
14 One part of the two-part standard set out in S. 1 for determining whether or not a
defendant shall receive an extended sentence adopts from Title X the language objected
to as vague by the Duardi court. Id. at 885-86. Compare S. 1 § 2302(b) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(f) (1970). Further, S. 1 retains the procedures for determining defendant's special
offender status: The judge, without a jury, determines that status on a preponderance of
the information. This is the very procedure that the Duardi court struck down as violative of due process. 384 F. Supp. at 883. Compare Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 with
18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
147 See House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 113, at 501 (Statement of Lawrence
Speiser, Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liberties Union).
148 S. 1 § 2302(b)(3), reprinted in note 107 supra.
2
149 Under S. 1 § 100 (a), a person is guilty of a criminal conspiracy
if he agrees with one or more persons to engage in conduct, the performance of
which would constitute a crime or crimes, and he or one of such persons in fact
engages in any conduct with intent to effect any objective of the agreement.
S. 1 § 1002(b) further provides that
[a]s used in this section, "objective" includes the commission of a crime, escape
from the scene of a crime, distribution of the fruits of a crime, and any measure
for concealing, or obstructing justice in relation to, any aspect of the conspiracy.
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extended term of imprisonment at a sentencing hearing following
defendant's conviction on a more "easily provable" underlying felony.
Similarly, if the underlying felony were committed as part of
what the court finds to be "a pattern of criminal conduct,"150 information alleging other criminal acts deemed as part of that pattern could
be the basis for an extended sentence. In both instances, the Government would in effect be obtaining a conviction and a sentence for
alleged criminal acts without being hampered by the evidentiary rules
or the reasonable doubt standard of an ordinary criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, the habitual offender section of S. 1151 may be
used to impose further imprisonment on a defendant merely for having committed the "crime" of being previously convicted and sentenced. In operation, the statute allows the bringing of a special
dangerous offender charge against anyone who commits a subsequent
felony within 10 years of his release from prison or custody for a prior
felony. The effect is that a person sentenced to ten years imprisonment and five years of subsequent parole will be subject to the imposition of an extended sentence if he commits another felony as
much as twenty-five years after his first conviction. Obviously, this
statutory provision bespeaks vindictiveness, not rehabilitation.
The extended sentence concept of S. 1 aims at a positive goal
-vesting discretion in the trial judge to tailor his sentence to the
individual defendant. However, this goal will never be achieved if the
standards guiding the judge are unconstitutionally vague, the procedural provisions violative of due process, and the results excessively
harsh.
PAROLE

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences
has become an integral part of the penological system. '"152 The purpose of parole is to serve as an intermediate step in the reintegration
of convicted offenders into society without requiring that sentences of
150 S. 1 § 2302(b)(2), reprinted in note 106 supra. A further definition is given:
criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same
or similar purposes, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.
Id. § 2302(b).
Id. § 2302(b)(1), reprinted in note 105 supra.
Is1
152 Morrissey v.Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
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imprisonment be served in full. 1 53 Parole serves, as well, to defray
correctional expenses.1 54 Parole, being a legislative creation, is essentially devoid of judicial control. Therefore, the efficacy of any parole
program is dependent upon the ability of the legislature to effectively
balance the interest of public safety against the value of reducing a
prison sentence to the shortest period consistent with rehabilitation.

An analysis of S. l's provisions dealing with parole indicates that the
bill fails to achieve an effective balance.
Section 3835 of S. 1155 effectively provides the federal parolee
with the minimum due process the Supreme Court has recently determined to be prerequisite to parole termination. In Morrissey v.
Brewer, 15 6 the Court visualized "two important stages in the typical
process of parole revocation.' 1 57 Briefly described, those stages consist of (1) a preliminary hearing in order to ascertain whether there
exists probable cause to believe that there has been a parole
violation 1 5 8 and (2) a revocation hearing at which
[t]he parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to
show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did,
that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not
warrant revocation. 159
The overall procedure must at least include notice to the parolee of
the alleged parole violations, the exposure of the evidence against
him, the opportunity to be heard, a chance to present and confront
witnesses before a hearing body, and a written statement giving reasons for terminating the parole.16 The formulators of S. 1 have commendably provided a two-step procedure for the revocation of parole
which comports with the minimum due process requirements mandated by Morrissey.161
153 Id.

15 Id.; see Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38
N.Y.U.L. REV. 702, 705-07 (1963).
155
See note 161 infra.
1- 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
157 Id. at 485.
138Id. at 485-87.
159 Id. at 487-88.
160 Id. at 485-87.
161 The parole revocation procedure proposed by S. 1 § 3835 may be summarized as
follows: A federal parolee may be arrested by an officer of the Federal Probation Service pursuant to a warrant issued by the Parole Commission, or without a warrant where
"reasonable grounds" exist in the mind of the officer that parole has been violated. Id.
§§ 3 8 3 5(a), 3 0 1 6(c). Once arrested, the parolee is entitled "without unnecessary delay"
to a "preliminary appearance" before the Parole Commission at a location suitably near

1975]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

S. 1 must, however, be criticized (1) for unduly extending the
period of time for which the Government may impose its dominion
and control over offenders by providing that a term of parole shall be
an automatic add-on to a term of imprisonment in certain cases,162

and (2) for establishing unduly restrictive standards on the discretion
of the Parole Commission to release a prisoner on parole prior to the
expiration of his sentence. 163
S. 1, as currently formulated, represents a significant departure
from the traditional practice of utilizing parole to decrease maximum
terms.164 It provides that any term of imprisonment resulting from

the commission of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor shall automatically include, above and beyond the assigned prison term, a separate
term of parole. 165 Such term of parole is to commence at the expiration of the inmate's prison term,
Parole Commission, within its

166

or at some earlier time if the
discretion, grants such earlier

the place where he was taken into custody. Such appearance shall be in order to ascertain if probable cause exists to believe a parole violation has occurred. At this time, the
parolee shall be permitted to deny or explain the alleged violation. If it is determined
that probable cause exists, a revocation hearing shall be scheduled within sixty days
thereafter. Id. §§ 3835(b), (c).
At the revocation hearing, the parolee shall be apprised of the evidence against
him, and shall be entitled, with the assistance of counsel, to testify, offer witnesses and
evidence, and confront opposing witnesses. Id. § 3835(d). If it is then concluded that
parole has been violated, the Commission, considering the gravity of the violation and
whether there have been prior violations, may order that parole be continued as before
or Linder modified conditions, or, may reimprison the parolee for a period equal to the
unserved portion of his original prison sentence, or for a "contingent" prison term of
one year in felony cases, or of ninety days where a Class A misdemeanor is involved.
Id. § 3835(e); see id. § 2303.
Where parole is revoked or modified, the parolee shall be advised of the reasons
therefor. Id. § 3835(f).
One aggrieved by a Commission determination to revoke or modify parole shall
have the opportunity to file an appeal of such determination within thirty days with the
National Appeals Board. Id. § 3836. Parole Commission determinations are denied judicial review. Such review is normally granted to other federal agency actions by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). See S. I § 3837.
162 See notes 164-80 infra and accompanying text.
i63 See notes 181-85 infra and accompanying text.
164 Federal courts have clearly identified the parole process as a means to mitigate
prison terms. See, e.g., Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938) ("Parole is intended
to be a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to society; to afford the
"); United States v. Richardson, 483
unfortunate another opportunity by clemency ..
F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Parole generally denotes a release before a sentence is
served."); Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D. Md. 1962) ("The purpose of
parole . . . is . . . to leave prison before the expiration of [the] term and to serve out its
balance while living in the community.").
165 S. 1 § 2303(a).
166 Id. § 3831(e).
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parole. 16 7 The Parole Commission has additional discretion in establishing the length of the parole term between a maximum of five
years and a minimum of one year. 168 As such, it is clearly within the
contemplation of S. 1 that an inmate, having served the maximum
authorized prison term for an offense, shall be liable for five more
years of federal custody in the form of parole. Furthermore, a parolee
who violates a condition of parole, may be subjected to yet an additional year of imprisonment.16 9 Thus, it is conceivable that a defendant convicted of a Class E felony (e.g., for failure "to comply with an
order . . . to appear at a specified time and place as a witness in an

official proceeding"' 170 ) could be incarcerated for three years in a federal penitentiary, and then be placed on parole for five years, during
which time he might be required to "reside at ...

treatment facility,'

1 71

a community

"refrain from excessive use of alcohol, '"172 "un-

dergo . . . psychiatric treatment,

'

173

or "permit a probation officer to

visit him at his home or elsewhere."' 1 74 A breach of any of these conditions of parole could result in reimprisonment for an additional
year. 1 75 Parole under such circumstances is hardly "a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to society [or] to afford the
unfortunate another opportunity by clemency."' 176 Rather, it is a
punitive device in and of itself, administered by an agency largely
outside the reach of judicial supervision.
The authorization of add-on parole terms seems to disregard the
fact that one rationale for the authorization of protracted sentences is
to provide a time span long enough to accommodate a prison term

and a period of limited freedom as provided by parole. One commen167 Id.

§ 3 8 3 1(c).

1611
Id. §§ 3834(a),
169Id.

§ 2303

Any period of parole ineligibility must have expired. Id.

(b).

§ 3831(a).

provides in part:

A sentence to a term of imprisonment in the case of a felony or a Class A
misdemeanor automatically includes . . . a separate:
(b) contingent term of imprisonment of:
(1) one year in the case of a felony; or
(2) ninety days in the case of a Class A misdemeanor
that may, in event of recommitment for violation of a condition of parole,
be ordered to be served in lieu of the term of the original sentence minus the
portion of the original sentence served in confinement prior to the parole,
if the contingent term of imprisonment is longer.
170Id.

§§

1332(a)(1), (c).
id. §§ 38 3 4(c), 2103(b)(12).
38
172See id. 99
34(c), 2103(b)(8).
173See id. 99 3834(c), 2103(b)(10).
8
1'4 See id. §§ 3 34(c), 2103(b)(16).
175Id. § 2303(b).
176 Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938).
171 See
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tator has recommended that S. l's sentencing maxima be made
subject to a "mandatory parole component," reducing to that extent
the period during which the prisoner can be actually detained
tinder the sentence. Thus the parole component would be inside
the statutory maximum rather than added on . ... 177

This position echoes that of the Brown Commission. 178 That body felt
that a mandatory parole component would alter the practice of releasing offenders from prison wholly without supervision, and eliminate
"any incentive for lengthening the total term in order to assure an
adequate period of post-prison supervision.' 1 79 In the event that the
sentencing provisions of S. 1 are not amended to include such "man-

datory parole components," it would seem imperative to expand the
scope of appeal of Parole Commission determinations. Review should
be obtainable for any parole sentence which places an offender under
the auspices of correctional authorities for a term beyond the maximum sentence of imprisonment.

180

Schwartz, supra note 65, at 3203.
Brown Commission's final report proposed that any prison sentence of
greater than six months be composed of a "prison component" and a "parole component." The length of the parole component was dependent on the maximum prison term
actually sentenced:
The parole component of such maximum term shall be (i) one-third for terms of
nine years or less; (ii) three years for terms between nine and fifteen years, and
(iii) five years for terms more than fifteen years; and the prison component shall
be the remainder of such maximum term. If, however, the parole component so
computed is less than three years, the court may increase it up to three years.
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, § 3201(2). The Commission explained:
A maximum term imposed under this section is the maximum time that the
person sentenced remains within the jurisdiction of the correctional authorities;
and part of that time (the "parole component") he must be enlarged on parole.
This contrasts with present law under which a prisoner may serve out his sentence within the walls and emerge without parole supervision. The parole
component also defines the maximum time that must be served on parole
where the Parole Board releases the prisoner at some early point in his sentence. Although ordinarily the parole component is envisioned as one-third of
the prison component, three-year and five-year maximums are set for parole
under long sentences, and provision is made for judicial flexibility in allocating
time between prison and parole where the maximum term imposed is relatively
short.
Id. § 3201, Comment, at 285-86.
179Id. § 3201, Comment, at 286.
180S. 1 in its present form permits an offender to appeal a Parole Commission determination to a National Appeals Board when the Commission has denied, modified, or
revoked parole, or where parole conditions other than those specified by the statute
have been imposed, S. 1 § 3836. As such, it would appear that a defendant could not
obtain review of a parole term solely on the ground that it was excessively long.
Furthermore, section 3725, dealing with appeals of sentences imposed by the trial
court, denies appeals to defendants sentenced to prison unless the term imposed ex177

178The
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Aside from the above considerations, S. 1 would place wholly inappropriate obstacles in the way of a prisoner seeking early release.
Initially, S. 1 authorizes the judge to withhold parole eligibility for
a period up to one-fourth of the maximum authorized sentence of imprisonment.' 8 1 This grants a sentencing judge the power to impose
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for periods as long as ten
years in certain cases.18 2 A judge's discretion in imposing a term of
parole ineligibility is governed by the same law-and-order criteriapreoccupied with retribution ("just punishment") and deterrencethat repeatedly recur throughout S. l's sentencing provisions. 18 3 A
more reasonable approach would be to bar parole only where the
public safety necessitates such action. In all cases, parole should rest
within the discretion of the parole board, which has the advantage of
being in a position to weigh the offender's post-conviction behavior
in its determination of whether to grant parole.
S. 1 goes on to provide that once a prisoner becomes eligible for
parole, the Parole Commission is mandated to make five factual findings before parole may be granted. The Commission must determine
that
(1) [the prisoner's] release at that time would not unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense, undermine respect for law,
ceeds one-fifth of the maximum term authorized for the convicted offense. It seems that
under no circumstances would this provision authorize an appeal of a Parole Commission determination. Even if the provision is judicially construed to permit appeals of
parole terms where the defendant is sentenced to prison for longer than one-fifth of the
maximum authorized sentence, it would still be of no avail to those convicted of Class E
felonies (maximum authorized prison term of three years) or Class A misdemeanors
(maximum authorized prison term of one year) who conceivably could be sentenced to
short prison terms but subjected to as long as five years of parole custody. See id.
§§ 2301(b)(5), (6), 2303(a), 3725(a)(1)(B), 3834(b).
181 Id. § 2301(d). In the case of a life sentence for a Class A felony, the parole
ineligibility period must be limited to ten years. Compare id. with id. § 2301(b)(1).
182 A ten-year period of parole ineligibility would arise in cases involving an extended sentence imposed on a "dangerous special offender," or where a Class A felony
was involved. See id. §§ 2301(b)(1), (c), (d).
183 S. 1 § 2302(c) provides in part:
The court, in determining whether to impose a term of parole ineligibilitN
within the range authorized by section 2301(d), and in determining the length
of the term, shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; and
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; and
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.
Compare id. with id. § 2302(a) (criteria for imposing a term of imprisonment) and id. §
2304(a) (criteria for imposing concurrent or consecutive terms).
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or prevent the administration of just punishment for the offense;
(2) his release at that time would not undermine the affording
of adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(3) there is no undue risk that he will commit further crimes or
otherwise fail to conform to such conditions of parole as would be
warranted under the circumstances;
(4) the continued provision of the educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment that he is
receiving at the prison facility will not substantially enhance his
capacity to lead a law-abiding life; and
(5) his release at that time would not have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline. 184
The prisoner seeking parole is squarely faced with the burden of
proving five seemingly unprovable negatives. How is a prisoner to
show that his parole will not "undermine respect for law" or undercut "the affording of adequate deterrence"? How shall a prisoner be
made responsible for "institutional discipline"? These criteria not only
generate a presumption against the granting of parole, they seem to
make it nearly unattainable.' i 5 In addition, even if a prisoner were
able to prove these five negatives, there is no mandate that parole
"shall" then be granted--only an authorization that
it "may" be
granted.' 8 6 The absence of such a mandate only serves to promote
arbitrary selectivity regarding those prisoners who are to be paroled.
The net effect of S. 1 is to unreasonably limit the opportunity of
a nondangerous offender to obtain parole prior to the expiration of his
prison term, thereby limiting his ability to reintegrate into the community. Concurrently, in pursuit of the goal of assuring that all inmates pass through a period of controlled freedom after imprisonment, S. 1 would extend potential federal custody over offenders for
six years1 8 7 after a maximum authorized term of imprisonment had
been served. Such additional custody would be wholly unnecessary in
light of the extended prison terms authorized by S. 1, and would
enable the Government arbitrarily to restrict the freedom of selected
offenders without adequate judicial control.
184

Id. § 383 1(c).

185 Schwartz, supra note 65, at 3204. Professor Schwartz, in raising these questions,

also noted that the Brown Commission (for which the Professor served as director) concluded that "release should be favored unless some public purpose was, in the opinion
of the Parole Board, served by detention." Id.
186Id.

187 Federal custody would be extended for six years beyond an imposed maximum

term of imprisonment in cases where (1) the inmate was subjected to a five-year parole
term, and (2) near the end of that term, the inmate was found to be a parole violator,
rendering him liable to yet another year in prison. See S. 1 § 2303.
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APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

S. 1 would greatly expand what has been until now a very limited right on the part of certain defendants to appeal criminal
sentences.' 8 8 Of grave concern, however, is the introduction into
federal law of the principle that federal prosecutors may also appeal
criminal sentences on the basis that such sentences are too lenient. S.
1400, the predecessor bill to S. 1, had no such provision for any form
89
of sentence review.1
Although courts have occasionally circumvented an entrenched
federal doctrine of nonreview,1 90 S. 1 would provide a statutory basis
18 See id. § 3725. There are presently only two situations in which federal statutes
provide for appellate review of sentencing. In the military criminal justice system such
review is authorized by 10 U.S.C. §§ 862-71 (1970). The other such authorization may
be found in Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3576
(1970). For a more detailed discussion of the specific provisions of these statutes see
Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of
Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463, 488-90 (1974).
The English experience with appellate review of sentencing has been amply
documented. See, e.g., Meador, The Review of Criminal Sentences in England, in ABA
PROJECT ON

MINIMUM STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO

APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, app. C (Approved Draft 1968); Thomas, Theories
of Punishment in the Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 MOD. L. REV. 546 (1964). For a
more recent analysis of the English experience see Hearings, supra note 2, at 5514-70
(Statement of Daniel J. Meador, Professor of Law, University of Virginia).
For a general discussion of the merits of appellate review of sentencing by leading
members of the American legal community see Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court:
Should There Be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13, 16-17 (1955); Appellate Review of
Sentences (A symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), 32 F.R.D. 249 (1963).
189The A.C.L.U., in its testimony criticizing S. 1400, called upon Congress for "the
long-overdue establishment of appellate review of criminal sentences." ACLU Statement Re: S. 1400, supra note 50, at 7974. It stressed that appellate review would tend to
provide equal punishment "for like offenders and like offenses." It would also permit
an additional judicial body to take into account individual mitigating circumstances. Id.
190 The federal doctrine of nonreview was first enunciated in Freeman v. United
States, 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919). Freeman had appealed his conviction for fraudulent use of the mails. 243 F. at 355. The Ninth Circuit
decided that there had been no error in the trial court's conviction or sentencing of
Freeman. Id. at 357. The court reasoned that although prior circuit courts had been
given statutory power to pronounce final sentences, the 1891 statute which created the
modern court of appeals included no such express language. The Freeman court felt
that absent such express statutory authorization, federal appellate courts are powerless
to review sentences. Id. Compare Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354, with
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 828, and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
"Since Freeman, no federal appeals court has expressly reviewed the severity of a
sentence as a normal incident of appellate power." Note, Appellate Review of Sentences
and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1359-60 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Federal appellate courts, however, have circumvented the doctrine of nonreview on
several bases. In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), the trial judge remarked at a
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for systematic review of sentences by both aggrieved offenders and
presentence hearing that all of the defendant's prior criminal arrests had resulted in
convictions when two had actually resulted in acquittals. The Supreme Court held that
this misinformation, together with denial of appointed counsel, deprived the defendant
of due process. Id. at 740-41. Subsequently, the rationale of Townsend has been used to
establish the principle that although the severity of a sentence is not to be subjected to
appellate review, the sentencing process is reviewable. See, e.g., United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir.
1971).
Furthermore, the doctrine of nonreview of sentencing discretion will not bar appellate review where there has been a failure to exercise such discretion. For example, in
Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (per curiam), the Supreme Court, "exercis[ing] its supervisory power over the administration of justice in the lower federal
courts," remanded the case to the trial court with a direction to enter a "time-served"
sentence for a defendant convicted of criminal contempt. Id. at 366-67. The defendant
had originally been convicted of eleven counts of contempt stemming from the repeated
refusal to answer eleven questions posed to the defendant in a separate criminal trial.
Id. at 364. The Supreme Court subsequently held that defendant's actions constituted a
single contempt, and remanded for a new sentence. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66,
76 (1957). The trial court then imposed a sentence for the single count equal to that
which had been formerly imposed for the eleven prior convictions. The Supreme Court
again reversed, finding the trial court had failed to exercise its discretion to reduce the
defendant's punishment "in light of the [former] reversal." 356 U.S. at 366. See also,
e.g., Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144 (8th Cir. 1973) ("[W]here . . . district
court has not exercised discretion in imposing sentence, there is no reason for [appeals
court] to defer to the trial court's judgment."); United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495,
498 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[Alppellate court may scrutinize a sentence to ascertain whether
there has indeed been an exercise of discretion.").
Appellate courts have also interceded on the behalf of defendants punished with
protracted sentences where it is perceived that the severity imposed was a result of the
defendants' refusal to admit guilt at the time of sentencing. Thomas v. United States,
368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.
1960) (sentence set aside where the severity of punishment was perceived as resulting
from a reluctance to plead guiltV).
At times, the doctrine of nonreview seems to have been disregarded altogether in
cases where sentences have been set aside simply on the grounds of gross abuse of
discretion in sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir.
1972).
For a comprehensive discussion of the historical development of the federal doctrine of nonreview of sentencing and exceptions thereto see Note, Appellate Review of
Sentencing arid the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1357.
Despite the above noted willingness of federal appellate courts to circumvent the
doctrine of nonreviewability of sentences, the Supreme Court in Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974), has yet referred to the doctrine as "traditional" and "wellestablished." Id. at 440-41. Thus the Court in that case offered no relief to a nineteenyear-old defendant who had been sentenced as an adult in alleged disregard of the
requirement that a federal trial court first determine that a young offender would not
derive greater benefit from the more lenient treatment afforded by the Federal Youth
Corrections Act. Two commentators have concluded that Dorszynski
will unquestionably have a "chilling effect" upon the efforts of courts of appeal
to recognize, apply and expand the basic principle of appellate review of criminal sentences.
Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 188, at 515.
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the Government. Under the proposals of S. 1, the defendant may
petition for appellate review of a sentence of imprisonment or fine if
the imposed sentence is in excess of one-fifth of the maximum authorized for the convicted offense. 19 1 Similarly, the Government may
petition for a review of a sentence or fine or imprisonment which is
less than three-fifths the maximum amount authorized under the ap92
propriate statutory provisions.1
Once the court of appeals grants the petition of either the defendant or the Government, the court is directed to weigh the reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account such considerations as
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(B) the purposes of sentencing required be considered ...
(C) the opportunity of the district court to observe the defendants; and
(D) the findings under [which] the defendant [may have been]
sentenced as a dangerous special offender .... 193
In any appeal, if the court of appeals concludes "that the sentence is not clearly unreasonable," it is directed to affirm the
sentence. 19 4 If, however, on appeal by the defendant, the court determines that the sentence is unreasonably excessive, it is mandated
to set aside the sentence and either: "(i) impose a lesser sentence; (ii)
remand the case for imposition of a lesser sentence; or (iii) remand
the case for further sentencing proceedings.' ' 19 5 On the other hand,
when the Government appeals, the appellate court may increase the
96
severity of the sentence. 1
Both constitutional and policy questions are engendered by S. l's
provision to allow the Government to appeal criminal sentences in
order to obtain a more severe sentence. These questions have never
been litigated because neither the federal government nor the states
191 S. 1 § 3725(a)(1). For a discussion of comparable provisions in certain states see
notes 197-98 infra and accompanying text.
192S. 1 § 3725(a)(2).
193Id. § 3725(c)(1).
19 Id. § 3725(d)(1)(A). Where an appeal is taken from a "dangerous special offender" extended sentence, the appellate court must also find that the defendant's classification as such an offender was not "clearly erroneous" in order to affirm. Id.
§§ 3725(c)(2), (d)(1)(B). Even if the classification was "clearly erroneous," the appellate
court must affirm it if the defendant's "sentence was not affected." Id. § 3725(d)(1)(B).
195Id. § 3725(d)(2)(A).
196Id. § 3725(d)(2)(B)(i). Alternatively, the court of appeals could "remand the

case for imposition of a greater sentence" or for "further sentencing proceedings."
Id. §§ 3725(d)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
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have ever been granted such broad appellate powers regarding sentencing. However, an initial indication as to whether governmental
appeals of sentencing will be permitted by the courts may be derived
from the position taken by the several courts which have addressed
the constitutionality of increasing the sentence of a defendant on an
appeal initiated by the defendant himself.
The great majority of states which permit a defendant to appeal
his sentence do not allow for sentence increases. 1 97 Connecticut,
Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts, however, do allow sentence increases where the defendant appeals.'19 8 Defendants in three of these
states have argued against such practice largely on double jeopardy
and due process grounds.
In Hicks v. Commonwealth, 199 a Massachusetts defendant objected solely on double jeopardy grounds to the imposition of a
greater sentence by a state appellate court hearing his appeal
of the sentence he received at trial. 20 0 The highest court of Massachusetts affirmed, noting that the petitioner could not have objected to the imposition of a longer sentence if he had appealed
his conviction, been retried, and received a more severe sentence
at the new trial. 20 1 The court held that if "a convicted defendant resorts to the statutory procedure . . . for review of a sentence
he assumes the same risks inherent in an appeal from a
conviction. '202
The highest court of Connecticut has used a similar analysis in
affirming the practice of extending sentences on appeal brought by
the defendant. In Kohifuss v. Warden of Connecticut State Prison,2"'
the court also looked to cases in which convicted defendants had obtained a new trial, and had received a harsher penalty at the second
197 ABA PROJECT ON

MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR

CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

STANDARDS

55 (Approved Draft, 1968).
198See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-196 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.15,
§ 2142 (Supp. 1974-75); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 134 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
278, § 28B (Supp. 1974).
199 345 Mass. 89, 185 N.E.2d 739 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963).
200 345 Mass. at 90, 185 N.E.2d at 740. Hicks had pleaded guilty to four indictments
charging him with armed robbery. He received concurrent sentences of fifteen to
twenty years for each charge. When he appealed his sentences to the appellate division,
his sentences were increased to twenty to twenty-five years for each count. Id. at 89-90,
185 N.E.2d at 739-40.
201 Id.
at 91, 185 N.E.2d at 740. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720
(1969); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919); State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136
S.E.2c: 205 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005 (1965), noted in 1965 DUKE L.J. 395.
202 345 Mass. at 91, 185 N.E.2d at 740-41 (emphasis added).
203 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962).
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
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proceeding. 20 4 It found these cases to establish a general rule that
there would be no double jeopardy where a convicted offender received a more severe punishment from an appeals court where he had
initiated the appellate proceeding.205 The court stated that
[tihe jeopardy, so far as the sentence is concerned, is a single, continuing one, and any change in the sentence results from the sen206
tenced person's own voluntary act.

In Robinson v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction,20 7 the
Fourth Circuit rejected alleged violations of double jeopardy, due
process, and cruel and unusual punishment where the defendant,
after having his sentence reviewed at his own request, received a
longer term of imprisonment.2 0 8 Addressing the double jeopardy argument, the court noted:
[T]he double jeopardy clause does not preclude reassessment of
every aspect of a criminal trial [including the propriety of the sentence] at the defendant's behest. 209

Furthermore, the court found that vacating an original sentence and
substituting a more severe one was distinguishable from the
"superimposing of a new sentence on one already served." 210 While
204 149 Conn. at 695-96, 183 A.2d at 628. Kohlfuss pleaded guilty to robbery with
violence and received an indeterminate sentence of two to seven years. When he
petitioned for appellate review of his sentence, it was increased to not less than three
nor more than seven years. Id. at 693-94, 183 A.2d at 627.
205 id. at 697, 183 A.2d at 628. In Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900), the
Supreme Court held constitutional the imposition (on remand) of a more severe sentence on a defendant who had had his initial sentence vacated as unconstitutional. Id. at
156. In rejecting the defendant's claim of double jeopardy, the court stated that
it is well settled that a convicted person cannot by his own act avoid the
jeopardy in which he stands, and then assert it as a bar to subsequent jeopardy.
Id. at 158. As the Court subsequently explained in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 721 (1969), on a successful appeal by the defendant, "the slate [is] wiped clean."
and thus no subsequent prosecutorial action can constitute a second jeopardy.
206 149 Conn. at 697-98, 183 A.2d at 628 (emphasis added). See also Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion), where Justice Holmes
stated:
[Lit seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more
than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The
jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause.
207 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972).
208 Id. at 1173. The review was conducted by a state three-judge panel called pursuant to MD.ANN. CODE art. 26, § 132 (1973).
209 455 F.2d at 1175 (emphasis added).
210Id. at 1176.
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the latter situation was acknowledged to be unconstitutional, the
former was held not to violate double jeopardy. Analysis of these
cases clearly shows that the theories of assumption of the risk, continuing jeopardy, and substitution of sentence have afforded justification for the imposition of enlarged sentences on defendants who have
sought appellate sentence review.
Unlike these cases, where the imposition of an increased sentence arose from a defendant-initiated appeal, S. 1 would authorize
the imposition of an increased sentence as a result of an appeal by the
Government. It is obvious that where the Government, not the defendant, initiates the review proceeding, the defendant may not be
said to have assumed the risks of his own voluntary act. Likewise,
where a defendant believes that his punishment has been justly determined or chooses voluntarily not to subject himself to the risk
of an increased sentence, his decision to forego appellate review
manifests his desire to terminate any fiture jeopardy in regard to
penalties.
Absent the justifications for increasing a sentence on a
defendant's appeal noted in Hicks and Kohifuss, an increased
punishment imposed as a result of a governmental appeal reduces
simply to the imposition of a second penalty atop one already assigned by the trial court. The Robinson attempt to distinguish substituted sentences friom cumulated add-on sentences is a triumph of
form over substance. What significant difference is there between two
prison terms cumulatively imposed and a single term equal in length
to the two?
As previously noted, the right of the Government to seek an
enlarged sentence on its own appeal has ncver been litigated. However, in Ex parte Lange, 211 the Supreme Court clearly indicated that
multiple sentencing of a defendant convicted of a single offense would
be tantamount to double jeopardy.2 1 2 In Lange, a state court sentenced the defendant to both a jail term and a fine where the controlling statute explicitly limited sentencing to either a fine or imprison-

ment. The defendant paid the fine and later petitioned the court on a
writ of habeas corpus to vacate the former judgment. The trial judge
vacated the sentence but resentenced the defendant to one year of
imprisonment.213
The Supreme Court held that the imposition of the prison term
211

212
2

13

85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
See id. at 168.
Id. at 164.
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after the fine had been paid constituted a violation of the double
jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment 2 14 because such a sentence amounted to "a second punishment . . . proposed in the same

court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offense.- 215 The
Court determined that the real core of double jeopardy is its
safeguarding against multiple punishments for the same offense:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more
than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced
on the same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and
found guilty, he can never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found
guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second
conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal,
he can be again sentenced on that conviction to another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second time,
21 6
is the constitutional restriction of any value?
The Court's logic compels the conclusion that without the countervailing considerations inherent in defendant-initiated appeals, the vacation of a criminal sentence or fine and the substitution of a more
severe one collides with the constitutional strictures against double
jeopardy. As the Court asked in Lange:
Is not [the double jeopardy clause's] intent and its spirit in such a
case as much violated as if a new trial had been had, and on a
217
second conviction a second punishment inflicted?

In United States v. Benz, 21 8 the Supreme Court quoted extensively from Lange in expressing its opinion that a court action to increase the punishment of one serving a criminal sentence is illegal
upon the ground that to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of
2 19
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id. at 170, 173.
Id. at 168. Nor in such cases may a court refund a fine, once paid, in order to
impose a prison sentence. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
216 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173.
214
215

217
218

219

Id.
282 U.S. 304 (1931).

Id.at 307.

1975]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

The Benz dictum 2 20 was noted by the First Circuit 22 1 which, Athough affirming the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing
222
appellate courts to increase a sentence on a defendant's appeal,
stated that
the Massachusetts procedure does not permit the state to reopen
the question of sentence on its own initiative. Were it to do so, it
would of course violate the proscription against double jeopardy. 223

Double jeopardy is not the only constitutional ground upon
which government-initiated appeals may be challenged. The potential
for retaliatory cross-appeals made as a matter of course by the Government whenever convicts seek review of their sentences constitutes
a deprivation of due process by chilling a convict's exercise of his
right of appeal.
Under S. 1, a defendant's sentence may not be increased when
he initiates the appeal. The sentence, however, mav be increased
pursuant to a government appeal, and thus it is likely that the Government will routinely respond to each defendant-initiated appeal
with a petition of its own simply in order to obtain bargaining leverage. In such manner the defendant ma' be pressured to withdraw his
petition for review with the understanding that if he withdraws, so
2 24
will the Government.
220 The issue in Betz was whether a federal district court had the power to modify a
sentence of imprisonment by reducing it on a petition by the defendant during the court
term in which it had been imposed. The Court held that all judgments, decrees, and
orders remained "within the control of the court during the term at which they were
made." Id. at 306. As such, during such term, the court had power to amend, modify, or
vacate such judgments and orders-with some limitations. One such limitation was the
constitutional restraint upon a court's power to increase a criminal bei-tence after the
defendant had begun to serve it.
221 Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1211 (1st Cir. 1971).
222
1d. at 1210-11.
223 Id. at 1211 (emphasis added).
224 See, e.g., Burr, Appellate Review As a Nfeans of Controlling Criminal Sentencing
Discretion-A Workable Alternative?, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 20 (1971). See also ABA
PROJECT ON MINIIUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 3.4, Comment b, at 57 (Approved Draft 1968):
[A] . . . serious problem could be created by giving the state the power to seek
an increase on appeal. The existence of such power could well have the effect
of preventing the defendant from appealing even on the merits of his conviction. The ability to seek an increase could be a powerful club, the very existence of which-even assuming its good faith use-might induce a defendant to
leave well enough alone.
The ABA also noted that permitting the Government to appeal sentences would probably not result in the review of sentences obtained by plea-bargaining. While such sentences are frequently far more lenient than those imposed on defendants convicted at
trial, a plea-bargainer would assuredly demand nonreview as part of his bargain. Id. As
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That such a practice constitutes a violation of due process derives
225
from language of the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce,
a case in which the Court held that due process is violated where
vindictiveness by the state played a role in a defendant's receipt of a
heavier sentence on retrial after a successful appeal had set aside a
former conviction. The Court stated:
A court is "without right to . . . put a price on an appeal. A

defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered. .

.

. [I]t is unfair to use the great power given to the court to

determine sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making
2 26
an unfree choice.-

As such,
since the fear of... vindictiveness [by the state] max unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation
on the part of the sentencing judge.

227

The Court has recently reaffirned this principle in Blackledge v.
Perry 2 8 where it was stated that due process requires that a defendant be free from concern that the Government will vindictively retaliate by "subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period
of incarceration" if he seeks to take advantage of a statutory postcon229
viction remedy.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Robin.s'on-which rejected the
due process argument against the imposition of a heavier sentence on
review- 2 3 0 does not realistically apply the standards framed by Pearce
and Blackledge. It is true that the Robinson court clearly suggested
that had the defendant demonstrated (1) "that the state [had] acted
vindictively," (2) that the increased penalty actually imposed was excessive or (3) that there had been "a pattern of increased sentences
from which one might infer an intent on the part of review panels to
23 1
chill applications for relief," the result might have been different.
The Fourth Circuit, however, oversimplified the defendant's position,
a result, those lenient sentences most deserving of review may end tip beyond the reach
of S. l's sentence review procedure.
225395 U.S. 711, 724-25 (1969).
226 Id. at 724 (quoting from Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir.
1966)).
227 395 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted).

228 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
229 Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
230 See notes 207-10 supra and accompanying text.
231455 F.2d at 1177.
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for, as the Supreme Court perceptively observed in Pearce, "retaliatory motivation [on the part of the Government] would, of course, be
extremely difficult to prove in any individual case."' 2 2 Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit failed to deal with the issue of whether or not
imposition of an extended sentence by an appellate court has a per se
chilling effect on the assertion of appellate rights.
Because, under S. 1, imposition of a heavier sentence mav result
only from a review action taken by the Government, 23 3 a defendant
has no opportunity accurately to assess the risks engendered before
making the decision whether or not to appeal. Under such circumstances, a defendant's decision to appeal cannot be "free and unfettered" and without apprehension of a retaliatory response.
Aside from questions of constitutionality, permitting the Government to appeal sentences in order to have them increased raises
important polic questions. For example, proponents of the allowance
of such appeals mav urge that government-initiated review is necessarv to eliminate disparity in punishment. The existence of such disparity, however, is an essential result of the precept of modern
penology "that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely
the crime. "234
The role of uniformity in sentencing should extend no further
than insuring that each defendant be accorded a just consideration of
7

his individual characteristics and acts. Uniformity of punishment,
however, is antithetical to individualized sentencing, which by its
very nature dictates that disparities in sentences must exist in light of
the differing circumstances and facts attendant upon what may appear
2 35
to be similar conduct.

Equally unconvincing is the argument that the right ofthe Government to appeal sentences is necessary to prevent a "floodgate" of frivolous no-risk appeals by defendants. The evidence indicates otherwise:
States which have permitted no-risk appellate review of sentencing

395 U.S. at 725 n.20 (emphasis added).
S. 1 § 3725(d)(2)(B).
234 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). For a discussion of the trend
toward individualized sentencing see Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 188, at 471-81.
235 See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959):
Necessarily, the exercise of a sound discretion in such a case required consideration of all the circumstances of the crime, for -[t]he belief no longer prevails
that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment."
...In discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the sentencing judge
is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances involved in the crime.
Id. (quoting from Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)) (citation omitted).
232
233
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for as long as one hundred and fifteen years 236 have not experienced
any such problem. 23 7 As such, the "floodgate" argument must be regarded as wholly speculative. Furthermore, since S. 1 provides appel23 8
late review by leave of the courts of appeals, and not as of right,
frivolous petitions from defendants may be dealt with summarily.
There remains a final disturbing aspect of S. l's approach to appellate review of sentencing: Access to the review procedures is arbitrarily limited. S. 1 authorizes only convicted felons to seek review of
their sentences. 23 9 As such, S. 1 would extend sentence review to a
Class E felon sentenced to eight months' imprisonment, 240 while denying such review to misdemeanants who may receive prison sentences of up to one year (or longer in cases where a multiple misdemneanant receives consecutive sentences). Moreover, S. 1 also bars
review of an\' sentence less than one-fifth of a maximum penalty
authorized. 241 As a result, prison sentences as long as six years could
not be appealed in given cases. 242 Absent any compelling justification, all defendants should be permitted to seek review of any sentence of imprisonment.2 43 On the basis of these considerations, the
various infirmities of S. 1 regarding appellate review of sentencing
make its passage inadvisable despite the acknowledged need for federal legislation in this area.
236 State legislatures have authorized state appellate courts to review legal but allegedly excessive criminal sentences since 1860 when the Iowa legislature did so. See
Iowa Code Rev. § 4925 (1860) as amended, IOWA CODE AN. § 793.18 (1950); Mueller,
Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 671, 671 (1962). Since that year, other states have followed suit, and today such
provisions are hardly uncommon. See, e.g., ARIz. RE'. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717 (1956);

HAWIAH REV. STAT.

§ 641-16 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1965); ORE.

REV. STAT. § 138.050 (1973 repl.); MODEL CODE CrIM. PROC. § 459 (1930). Other
states afford defendants the opportunity to review sentences under general review statutes. For examples of such states and a discussion thereof see Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 221, 238-39 (1972).
237 See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCING § 3.4, Comment, at 59 (Approved
Draft 1968). This, however, may well be due to the rarity of the use of such procedures.
Id.
238 See S. 1 §§ 3725(a), (b).
239 Id. § 3725(a).
240 A Class E felony is punishable by up to three years in prison. Id. § 2301(b)(5).
Under S. 1, a Class E felony is entitled to petition for review of an eight-month sentence because such punishment is greater than one-fifth of the maximum authorized
penalty. See id. § 3725(a)(1)(B).
241 See id. § 3725(a)(1)(B).
242 A Class B felony is punishable by up to thirty years in prison. As such, a Class B
felon who had received a six-year prison term would not be entitled to review of his
sentence. Compare id. with id. § 2301(b)(2).
243 See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 3204.
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Aside from the questions of whether Congress should reinstate
a death penalty24 4 and whether capital punishment serves as a deterrent to crime, 245 an analysis of S. l's death penalty provisions reveals serious deficiencies. Perhaps the most frightening is that S. 1
would extend the death penalty to a vast range of persons convicted
under vague and expansive definitions of "espionage" and "sabotage."
For example, under the espionage provision, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg
and the publishers of The New York Times or the Washington Post
246
could have been convicted and subjected to the death penalty.
Under the sabotage provision, assembly line workers who engage in
symbolic acts of protest and cause any damage at all to a major weap24 7
ons system may be convicted and subjected to the death penalty.
While it is doubtful that the Government would actually seek the
death penalty for these offenses, the danger is that it provides the
2 48
Government with the power to do so.
Concededly, a number of public opinion polls have found widespread support for a return to capital punishment as a stern deterrent to murder, skyjacking, and other crimes of violence. S. 1 exploits
this fear. It is doubtful, however, whether the public realizes that
the bill sanctions the death penalty not only for murder, but also for
those who vigorously oppose governmental policy. It is equally
doubtful whether the public, if it were aware of the implications of
244This question was debated heavily during hearings on S. 1400, the substantially identical predecessor of S. 1. For criticism of the restoration of capital punishment as proposed by S. 1400 § 2401(a) see Clark, Prologue to Symposium on Proposed
Federal Criminal Codes, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 817, 824 (1973); Schwartz, .1upra note 10,
at 3271; Comment, Congressional Rebirth of the Death Penalty: Guiding the Jury Past
Furman t. Georgia, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 893 (1973). For the perspective of a federal prosecutor see Connelly, The Proposed Federal Criminal Codes: A Prosecutor's Point of
Vietv, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 826, 835-42 (1973).
Two recent books dealing with capital punishment express opposition to the death
penalty. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1974) (fair and rational application of the
death penalty is a logical impossibility); W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (1974)

(factual data demonstrates that both discretionary and mandatory death penalties have
been marked by racial discrimination and arbitrariness).
245 For a discussion of the deterrent value, or lack of it, provided by capital punishment see CLARK, supra note 3, at 330-37; THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 258-332
(H. Bedau ed. 1967); M. DISALLE, THE POWER OF LIFE OR DEATH (1965).
246 For a discussion of the espionage provision and its implications see notes 34447 infra and accompanying text.
247 For a discussion of sabotage see notes 348-50 infra and accompanying text.
248 It is this power to prosecute a wide range of activities normally associated with
the exercise of first amendment rights which renders S. 1 so threatening to the freedom
of expression essential to a democratic form of government. See generally Crystal, supra
note 11, at 591.
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the penalty provided in S. 1, would support such a provision in light
of the dramatic events of the past decade and the repeated proof of
governmental misconduct and lawbreaking.
Equally debatable is whether the death-sentence provisions of S.
1, skillfully drafted as they are, adequately satisfy the constitutional
prerequisites set forth by the Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia,24 9 the decision which effectively rendered the federal death
250
penalty, as well as those of 39 states, null and void.
S. 1 seeks to revitalize the death penalty, limiting capital crimes
to four and adopting a bifurcated procedure for imposing the death
sentence. Draftsmen of S. 1 hope that this will meet the Furman
requirements that death sentence discretion be restricted and that
crimes punishable by death be more narrowly defined. Wholly apart
from the question of whether the death penalty is per se constitutional, analysis indicates that the criteria written into the death penalty
provisions of S. 1 fail to meet adequately the standards required by
Funnan.
Furman v. Georgia: An Analysis
In Furmnan, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty as
administered in three cases involving the statutes of two states 25 1 was
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 252 The precise import of the decision is unclear,
since the majority holding consisted of a brief per curiam opinion
accompanied by nine individual opinions, five concurring and four
dissenting. Of those concurring, only Justices Brennan and Marshall
would hold capital punishment unconstitutional per se. 253 Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White confined their opinions to those statutes
249 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
250

See id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

21 The cases before the Court involved death sentences imposed for murder under

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), rape under GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp.
1971), and rape under TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1189 (1961). See 408 U.S. at 239.
252 408 U.S. at 239-40. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
On the same day it decided Furman, the Court vacated death sentences imposed in
26 states under a variety of statutory provisions. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845 (1972) (per curiam); 408 U.S. 932-41 (orders vacating sentences). For a description
of the various schemes which were in effect struck down by the Court see Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1690, 1690 & n.3 (1974).
In addition, Furman mandated the reversal of death sentences which had been imposed in approximately 600 cases. See 408 U.S. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
253 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).

1975]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

which permitted the death penalty to be imposed in an indiscriminate
and arbitrary manner. 254 The four dissenters, on the other hand, concluded that imposition of the death penalty has been and continues to
be within the constitutional prerogative of legislative bodies. 2 55 Although the greatest fault found by the dissenters was what they
viewed as the majority's usurping a legislative function, concern was
expressed that the decision would result in the passing of mandatory
sentence procedures which would eliminate judicial discretion altogether. Such a result would be "regressive" according to Justice
Blackmun 256 and, according to Chief Justice Burger, would very
2 57
likely be itself unconstitutional.
Therefore, the difficulty facing Congress in seeking to revitalize
the federal death penalty is to construct a statute which will gain the
support of "swing" Justices Stewart, White, or Justice Douglas' successor, Justice Stevens, 258 without losing the support of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun.
Justice Stewart's major objection to the death penalty as imposed
under the statutes at issue was its arbitrariness, represented by the
fact that some offenders were sentenced to death, while others,
equally culpable, were not. 259 In his view, the infliction of death
under any legal system which "permit[s] this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed" is unconstitutional. 260 Whether
Justice Stewart would tolerate any discretion which would or could
lead to capricious results is unlikely. 2 6 1
254 See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
25 See id. at 375, 404 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 410, 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 433-J4 (Powell, j., dissenting); id. at 468 (Reinquisi, j., dissentinig).
256 See id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
257 See id. at 401, 402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2'1 While Justice Douglas emphasized that he was dealing with "discretionary
statutes . . . unconstitutional in their operation," he also issued the caveat that even
laws which are not facially discriminatory "may he applied in such a way as to violate
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 256-57. He indicated that even a mandatory death
penalty would be unconstitutional if it resulted in harsher results for minority races than
for "the elite." Id. at 257.
With Justice Douglas' retirement from the bench, however, this singular viewpoint
has been removed from the nation's highest court. Justice Stevens' position on the issues
of capital punishment is not yet known.
259 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). He commented: "These death sentences
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. at 309.
260 Id. at 310 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart's repeated use of the phrase "legal
system" rather than "sentencing procedure" might imply a willingness to consider discretion stemming from sources outside sentencing authorities. But see note 261 infra.
261 Justice Stewart himself stated that only an absolute mandatory death statute
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Justice White based his opinion on the infrequency of the death
penalty and the lack of a meaningful basis to distinguish "the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not."-2 62 He concluded that the death penalty was so seldom enforced
and so infrequently imposed that it served no legitimate social ends
such as retribution, deterrence, and the reinforcement of community
values. 263 As such, the death penalty was "patently excessive" and,
therefore, cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment.264
While the setting of standards through more precise definitions
of crimes, coupled with a legislative mandate that death be imposed
when those standards are met, may provide the rational basis demanded by Justice White 265 and mitigate the capriciousness complained of by Justice Stewart, 266 certain questions remain unanswered. First, Justice Stewart referred to any "legal system" which
allows arbitrary results. 267 His opinion could be interpreted as suggesting that the elimination of discretion in one segment of the system may be insufficient if arbitrariness results from uncontrolled discretion in other segments. Secondly, Justice Stewart did not state
that a completely nondiscretionarv systern would be constitutional,
but only that confrontation with such a system would force him to
consider whether the death penalty is unconstitutional per se. 2 6 8 The
answer to this, he indicated, could be achieved only by weighing the
necessity for retribution and deterrence against the advisability of reform and rehabilitation. 2 69 Hence, Justice Stewart reserved his decision on the ultimate question.
Justice White, on the other hand, stated explicitly that he was
not intimating "that there is no system of capital punishment that
would comport with the Eighth Amendment" 2 70 and explained that
"[t]he facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of
the death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined
categories of murder, or for rape," would be an entirely different
question. 271 However, his emphasis on the infrequency of the imwould force him to confront the per se constitutionality of the death penalty. 408 U.S. at
307.
262 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
26
3Id. at 311-12.
26 4
Id. at 312.
26 5
See id. at 310-11.
266 See id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring).
267 Id. at 309-10.
26s Id. at 307.
269

Id.

270 Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
271 Id. at 310.
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position of the death penalty suggests that even if a statute passes
facial constitutional muster, empirical data showing that the death
sentence is rarely administered may persuade him that it serves no
social purpose and therefore cannot be justified.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty implicit in Furman was voiced by
Chief Justice Burger. While acknowledging that the way to satisfy the
apparent requirements of the two pivotal Justices may be to provide
standards to guide sentencing authorities in meting out capital
punishment, he expressed doubt that this would have any real impact
in the discretionary nature of the sentencing procedure. 272 He acknowledged that substantial change could occur if death were mandatory and juries were prevented from handing down verdicts on lesser
charges. 27 3 However, the Chief Justice indicated he would prefer
abolition of capital punishment to this type of system which, in effect,
mandates either death or acquittal. 274 The ultimate question then becomes whether any capital sentencing procedure can eliminate the
potential for arbitrariness short of an absolute death-or-acquittal mandate. And more pragmatically, just how much expansion or reduction
in discretion and possible arbitrariness would Justices Stewart and
White find acceptable?
The Furman holding may be clarified when the Court issues its
opinion in Fowler v. North Carolina,275 which has been scheduled for
rehearing during the 1975 term. At issue in Fowler is the constitutionality of North Carolina's mandatory death penalty.276 Since the
272

Id. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

273 Id.

•2-, id.
275 Cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1974) (No. 73-7031), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3582 (Apr.
21, 1975), set for reargument, 43 U.S.L.W. 3674 (Jun. 23, 1975), appeal from State v.
Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974). Arguments, originally heard by the Supreme Court on April 21, 1975, are summarized at 17 CPim. L. REP. 4030-32 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Summary of Arguments].
216 The statutes provide a mandatory death penalty for murder and rape in the first
degree; however, the jury is allowed to return verdicts on lesser included charges. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (murder), 14-21 (rape) (Supp. 1974); State v. Roseboro, 276
N.C. 185, 196, 171 S.E.2d 886, 893 (1970). Penalties for lesser-degree murder verdicts
range from life imprisonment to a minimum two years' imprisonment. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17. Penalties for lesser-included rape charges range from life imprisonment
to "a term of years, in the discretion of the court." Id. § 14-21.
The arguments put forth before the North Carolina supreme court in Fowler
expressly incorporate those of an amicus curiae brief filed by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721
(1974). See State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 107, 203 S.E.2d 803, 815 (1974).
In Jarrette, the North Carolina supreme court rejected contentions that the state's
death penalty was unconstitutional. 284 N.C. at 666, 202 S.E.2d at 747. The court
reasoned that (1) the discretion vested in the prosecutor to charge defendants with capi-
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mandatory sentence permits no sentencing discretion, the Court will
be forced to consider whether discretion in other quarters renders
the penalty arbitrary and hence unconstitutional under Furman.
Specifically, the Court will be asked to consider prosecutorial discretion in levying charges, jury discretion on returning lesser included
charges, and executive-presidential or gubernatorial--discretion in
2 77
commutation of sentences.
The Court will also hear arguments, originally put forth in
Furman, that the death penalty is imposed in such a small number of
cases it is clearly selective and arbitrary; that the penalty is unfair
because those subjected to death are primarily nonwhite; and finally,
that the death penalty has been universally repudiated, is therefore
cruel and unusual, and hence should be declared unconstitutional
27 8
per se.
The Legislative Response to Furman
Because the Supreme Court has never declared the death penalty unconstitutional per se, Congress and state legislatures have devised alternative statutory schemes that attempt to reduce or eradicate the problems of overbroad discretion and arbitrariness which had
characterized state death penalty provisions, found in Furman to be
constitutionally infirm. Since Furman was decided in June, 1972,
thirty-one state legislatures have passed new death penalty statutes. 279 In grappling with what they perceive Funnan's dictates to be,
280
legislators have adopted four basic approaches.
Under the first approach, death may be imposed if the sentencer
tal or lesser crimes is a necessary delegation of responsibility, imposing a duty to seek
conviction for the crime committed and not for a lesser or more serious crime, id. at
656-57, 202 S.E.2d at 741-42; (2) jury discretion in returning lesser verdicts is irrelevant
because implicit in the guarantee of trial by jury is the possibility that juries will reach
"different verdicts . .. in different cases upon different evidence" and this possibility is
not a sound reason to preclude the levying of a penalty "upon one found guilty by the
jury which tried him," id. at 657, 202 S.E.2d at 742; (3) the fact that only a small number
of defendants have been convicted and sentenced to death does not render the penalty
arbitrary, since (a) all those convicted of first-degree murder were in fact sentenced to
death, id. at 660, 202 S.E.2d at 744 and (b) discrimination on grounds of race was not
established by the record, id. at 660-62, 202 S.E.2d at 744-45; and (4) public opinion
has not, in fact, repudiated the death penalty as witnessed by (a) the reinstatement of
the death penalty by state legislatures and (b) the affirmative responses of prospective jurors when asked if they considered death an appropriate penalty for certain
crimes, id. at 662-63, 202 S.E.2d at 745-46.
277 See Summary of Arguments, supra note 275, at 4031.
278 See generally id. at 4030-32.
279 Id. at 4032 (argument by Richard Bork, Solicitor General of the United States).
280See Note, supra note 252, at 1699-1700.
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finds that one or more prescribed aggravating circumstances acconpanied the commission of the crime. The sentencer is, however, allowed to consider any mitigating factors which it feels might be
relevant. 281
The second approach requires that the sentencer consider
specific mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances. The sentence
28 2
is determined by weighing and balancing these factors.
The third approach is similar to the second in that the sentencer
must ascertain the existence or nonexistence of prescribed aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It differs in that death is mandatory
where at least one of the aggravating but none of the mitigating circumnstances are present, and death is prohibited if any mitigating fac28 3
tor is determined to exist.
281 See id. at 1699; see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528, -2534.1, -2537 (Supp.
1974); II. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-IA (Smith-Hurd Supp. 197576); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-105 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3206, -207, 76-5-202 (Supp. 1975).
The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the constitutionality of this approach in
Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612 (1974). The court concluded that the Georgia statute substantially narrowed the sentencer's discretion and provided for swift appellate review, thereby complying with Furmnan principles. See id. at 834, 204 S.E.2d at
616. In State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467 (Utah 1974), the Utah supreme court upheld a
statute which allows the court, upon a jury recommendation, to impose life imprisonment at hard labor instead of capital punishment for a person convicted of first degree
murder. The court stated that it was not convinced that Furman necessarily invalidated
Utah's statute. Id. at 468.
For a discussion of the new Illinois death penalty statute see Note, The New
Illinois Death Penalty: Double Constitutional Trouble, 5 LOYOLA U.L.J. 351 (1974). For
a discussion of the problems inherent in a procedure allowing a sentencer to consider
"any relevant mitigating" factor see Note, supra note 252, at 1700-05.
282 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-453-54 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-4702, 41-4710-12 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1975-76);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2521-23 (Supp. 1974).
Balancing mitigating and aggravating circumstances is the basic approach taken by
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1974). This approach was upheld by the Florida supreme
court in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973). The court interpreted Furman as
allowing "reasonable and controlled" judicial discretion which it held the statute met
by requiring consideration of specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 7.
The Dixon court emphasized the importance of appellate review of the circumstances in
each case and a comparison of sentences with those meted out in other similar cases. Id.
at 10. Dixon was followed subsequently in Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433, 436 (Fla.
1975).

For a discussion of this approach and the Dixon decision see Note, supra note 252,

at 1704-08.
283 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE

§§

190.1-.3 (West Supp. 1975); CONN.

GEN. STAT.

ANN. §§ 53a-45, - 4 6a (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. § 18-1311 (Supp. 1975-76).

The California statute has been upheld in two county superior court decisions. In

People v. Purcell, 15 CliuI. L. REP. 2001 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County 1974),
the court upheld the restoration of capital punishment via constitutional amendment by
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The final approach mandates the death penalty upon conviction
28 4
of certain explicitly defined crimes.
The scheme proposed by S. 1 is similar to those taken bv the states
referendum and found that the new statute conforms to Furman standards. In People v.
Sims, 15 CpdM. L. REP. 2239 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County 1974), the court,
citing State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972), reasoned that Furman invalidated
only uncontrolled discretion in imposing capital punishment. 15 CalM. L. REP. at 2240.
The court rejected attacks on prosecutorial discretion on the ground that initiating actions and determining charges are necessary prosecutorial functions and that it is presumed that "government officials will properly and fairly exercise their inherent
power." Id.
284 See, e.g., IND. ANN.

STAT. § 35-13-4-1 (Code ed. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §

14:30 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, -21, 97-25-55 (Supp. 1974): NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.030 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-17, 14-21 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.1, .3 (Supp. 1974-75);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (Supp. 1975).
The Louisiana mandatory death penalty for aggravated rape was upheld in State v.
Selman, 300 So. 2d 467 (La. 1974). The state supreme court read Furman to prohibit
only discriminatory application of the death penalty and held that by removing the
sentencer's power to levy a verdict of guilty without the imposition of capital punishment, the uncontrolled discretion complained of in Furman had been removed. Id. at
472-73. The Louisiana court was unmoved by the discretion inherent in the sentencer's
ability to return responsive verdicts of lesser included charges. See id. at 473. The court
followed Selman in State v. Hill, 297 So. 2d 660 (La.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090
(1974), wherein it upheld a first-degree murder statute which, while it mandated the
death penalty, allowed the sentencer to respond with verdicts of lesser included crimes
for which death was not prescribed. Id. at 661-62.
The Oklahoma mandatory death penalty was upheld in Williams v. State, 17 CRUM.
L. REP. 2350 (Okla. Crim. App. July 8, 1975), a case involving two robbery-murder
defendants. The court rejected the argument that discretion inherent in prosecutorial
functions, the jury's ability to consider lesser included charges, the appeals court's
power to modify the death sentence, and the governor's power to commute violated
Furman. Id. at 2351.
The Massachusetts death penalty has been considered by courts of that state in
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1975) and Commonwealth v. Harrington, 323 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 1975). In Harrington, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that the state death penalty which had been enacted in 1951 could
not be upheld merely by severing its mercy provisions. Id. at 898-901. In O'Neal, when
faced with a rape-murder sentencing issue, the court postponed decision, asking counsel
to submit briefs on the issue of whether the death penalty comports with due process
requirements. 327 N.E.2d at 668-69. The court added that under such cases as Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"life" is considered to be a fundamental right and that to justify imposition of the death
penalty, the state must show that it serves a compelling state interest. 327 N.E.2d at
667-68.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194
S.E.2d 19 (1973), interpreted Furman as prohibiting a discretionary imposition of the
death penalty by either judge or jury. Id. at 439, 194 S.E.2d at 25. However, the discretion provision of the statutes in question were found to be severable. Id. at 444-45, 194
S.E.2d at 28. Accordingly, the court severed the mercy provision and imposed mandatory death sentences for persons convicted of first degree murder, rape, first degree
burglary, and arson. Id. at 445, 194 S.E.2d at 28-29.
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which have adopted the third or quasi-mandatory approach. 2 85 S. l's
death penalty scheme had its genesis in its predecessor, S. 1400.
This bill was drafted at the behest of President Nixon, who directed
the Justice Department to draft a federal capital punishment statute
free of the constitutional infirmities noted by the "swing votes" in
Funnan.28 6 He announced his position, first, in a radio address to the
nation on March 10, 1973,287 and later by a package of legislation

sent to Congress the following week aimed at continuing and expanding what he called the war on crime. 28 8 This package, representing
the fruits of the Justice Department's labor, was known as S. 1400,
the Administration's proposed "Criminal Code Reform Act of
1973. '"289 In a message sent to Congress accompanying S. 1400, President Nixon, while "not contend[ing] that the death penalty is a
panacea that will cure crime," said that it could be a "valuable de290
terrent" on the federal level.

Essentially, the approach taken in S. 1400 in attempting to avoid
unconstitutionality for arbitrariness and capriciousness was to establish a bifurcated trial procedure with purportedly objective standards
to guide the sentencing authorities. 291 A similar approach was taken in
separate death penalty bills introduced in the House and Senate at
the same time. 292 The major difference between the capital punishThe death penalty for a person convicted of rape and first degree murder was upheld in State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974), despite arguments that

prosecutorial discretion and the power of the governor to commute a death sentence
rendered the statute invalid under Furman. Id. at 657-58, 202 S.E.2d at 742-43. It
further repudiated the inference that persons sentenced to death since Waddell were
predominantly non-white. 284 N.C. at 660-62, 202 S.E.2d at 744-45.
The North Carolina statute is currently under consideration by the Supreme Court
in the case of Fowler v. North Carolina, cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). See notes
275-76 supra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 747, 204
S.E.2d 258 (1974), upheld a mandatory death penalty for a person convicted of murdering a prison guard in an escape attempt. The court viewed Furman as affecting only
statutes which permitted discretionary imposition of the death penalty and not affecting
mandatory death penalty statutes. Id. at 749, 204 S.E.2d at 260-61.
285 Compare S. 1 §§ 2401, 2402 with note 283 supra and accompanying text.
286 See Sixth in a Series of Presidential Messages to the Congress on the State of
the Union, supra note 2, 9 PRES. Doc. at 265.
287 9 PRES. DoG. 246 (1973).
288 See Sixth in a Series of Presidential Messages to the Congress on the State of
the Union, supra note 2.
289 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
290 Sixth in a Series of Presidential Messages to the Congress on the State of the
Union, supra note 2, at 264-65.
291 See S. 1400 § 2402.
292 See S. 1401, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and three companion bills H.R. 6028,
H.R. 6300 and H.R. 6817, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). S. 1401 was passed by the Senate
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ment provision in S. 1400 and those in the independent versions is
that the latter pertain only to crimes already codified in Title 18.293
The future of these bills, as well as others introduced in the 94th Congress on the subject of capital punishment, 294 is dependent on the
outcome of the current S. 1, which is substantially similar to its predecessor, S. 1400.295
The Death Penalty Provisions of S. 1

S. 1, like its legislative predecessors, utilizes a procedure novel
to federal criminal law in an attempt to comply with Furman. This
new feature is the bifurcated trial. By this procedure, a trial is first
held in which the jury determines the defendant's guilt. 296 If there is
a verdict of guilt, a subsequent hearing is held to determine the ap29 7
plicability of the death sentence.
Establishment of this bifurcated procedure results logically
enough from the implications of Fumnan and the insistence of Justices

Stewart and White that the sentencing process be free from
caprice. 2 98 Without this separate evidentiarv hearing on whether capital punishment should be ordered, the trial judge would face an insuperable burden in deciding whether the jury which is to determine
the defendant's guilt should also have the opportunity to consider
evidence pertinent to the separate issue of punishment. The trial
judge would then face a Hobsoun's choice: If evidence relevant to the
sentencing issue were admitted, the jury would have valuable inforon March 13, 1974. See 120 CONG. REC. S 3721 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1974). The house
bills were not reported out of the Judiciary Committee. See 2 CCH 1973-74 CONG.
INDEX 3799. They have been reintroduced in the 94th Congress as H.R. 2865, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
293 Compare S. 1401, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) with S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
294 See, e.g., H.J. Res. 140, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (to amend the Constitution
"to permit the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in certain cases"); H.R.
1478, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (to amend Title 18 of the United States Code to
provide the death penalty for kidnapping in certain circumstances).
On the other side of the coin see H.R. 1602, 4134, and 9156, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) (identical bills proposing abolition of capital punishment "tinder all laws of the
United States").
295 See generally Crystal, supra note 11, passim.
26 See S. I §§ 2401-02.
297See id. § 2402. The hearing is to be conducted before the jury which found the
defendant guilt'. Id. § 2402(a)(1). However, it may be conducted before a specially
impaneled sentencing jury when the defendant pleaded guilt', was convicted following
a nonjury trial, the court discharged the trial jury for good cause, or the case was remanded for resentencing by the court of appeals. Id. § 2402(a)(2). The hearing may be
conducted before the trial judge alone on defendant's motion and upon approval by
both the court and the Government. Id. § 2402(a)(3).
298 See notes 259-71 supra and accompanying text.
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mation to help it make an intelligent detennination of the applicability of the death penalty. However, the trial judge would risk prejudicing the jury's initial determination of guilt or innocence. On the
other hand, if evidence as to the defendant's background and other
sentencing factors were excluded, the jury would make the fatefiul
determination of life or death without the necessary information.
Bifurcation is intended to avoid this dilemma.
Under S. 1, conviction of any of four felonies-treason, sabotage,
espionage, and murder-might warrant imposition of the death penaltv if certain aggravating circumstances are found to exist and certain
mitigating circumstances are absent. 299
In cases of treason, sabotage, and espionage, the death penalty
is deemed to be warranted if the defendant had previously been convicted of any of these offenses and a sentence of death or life imprisonment had been authorized for this prior conviction; 300 he had
"knowingly created a grave risk of substantial impairment of the national defense";3 0 1 or he had "knowingly created a grave risk of death
to any person"3 0 2 during the commission of the offense.
One convicted of murder might be subject to the death penalty if
at least one of eight prescribed circumstances is found to exist at the
time of the commission of the oflense. Three of these circumstances
turn upon the status of either the victim or the defendant. 303
The five circumstances not pertaining to the status of either the
victim or the defendant include:
(1) a murder committed while the defendant was engaged
30 4
in the commission of certain felonies;
(2) a murder committed whereby the defendant had "knowingly created a grave risk of death" to a person other than the
victim; 305
(3) a murder committed "in an especially heinous, cruel, or
30 6
depraved manner";
(4) a murder committed whereby the defendant had procured its commission by another "by payment, or promise of
30 7
payment, of anything of pecuniary value";
299S. 1 § 2401(a).
300 Id. § 2401(a)(1)(A).
301 Id. § 2401(a)(1)(B).
302 Id. § 2401(a)(1)(C).
303 See id. §§ 2401(a)(2)(A)-(H).
304Id. § 2401(a)(2)(A).
305 Id. § 2401(a)(2)(D).
306 Id. § 2401(a)(2)(E).
307 1d. § 2401(a)(2)(F).
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(5) a murder committed by a perpetrator who was paid
"anything of pecuniary value. "308
The status of the victim is relevant if the victim is either the
President of the United States or any "potential successor," 30 9 a
foreign head of state, 3 10 a dignitary representing a foreign government on official business in the United States, 3 11 or a public servant
murdered either during the performance of his official duties or because of his status as a federal public official. 312 The status of the
defendant is relevant if he "ha[d] been convicted of another federal
offense, or a state offense involving the death of a person" and "a
sentence of life imprisonment or death was authorized, 3 1 3 or if the
defendant has had at least two prior felony convictions arising out of
two separate incidents where "serious bodily injury" was inflicted
314
upon another person.
S. 1 also provides that, despite the presence of one or more of
these aggravating circumstances, imposition of the death penalty is
prohibited when any of six mitigating circumstances are present at
the time of the offense. 315 Thus, if the defendant was under the age
31 7
of eighteen, 316 his mental capacity was "significantly impaired,"
or he was subjected to "unusual and substantial duress,- 3 18 the
death penalty cannot be imposed. Similarly, whether the defendant
had been acting merely as an accomplice 3 19 or whether he "could not
reasonably have foreseen that his conduct . ..would cause, or would
create a grave risk of causing, death to any [other] person" 320 are also
relevant considerations in determining the sentence. The final circumstance occurs in the situation where the defendant had been holding hostages but had released them in reliance upon an assurance by
308

Id. § 2401(a)(2)(G).

309 Id.

§ 2401(a)(2)(H)(i). Potential successors to the presidency include the
President-elect, the Vice President or the next in line in presidential succession, and
the Vice President-elect. Id. § 1359(a)(1)(C).
310 Id. § 2401(a)(2)(H)(ii).
311Id. § 2401(a)(2)(H)(iii).
312Id. § 2401(a)(2)(H)(iv). "Public offical" includes federal public servants who are
U.S. officials, law enforcement officers, and employees of official detention facilities.
3i3 Id. § 2401(a)(2)(B).
314 Id. § 2401(a)(2)(C). No distinction is drawn between state and federal felony
convictions for the purpose of this section. Id.
315Id. § 2401(b).
316
317

Id. § 2401(b)(1).

Id. §

318 Id.

Id.

2401(b)(2).

§ 2401(b)(3).

319 § 2401(b)(4). It is also required in order to preclude a death sentence that the
defendant's participation be "relatively minor." Id.
320 Id. § 2401(b)(5) (emphasis added).

19751

FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

the Attorney General that no death penalty would be authorized if
3 21
the hostages were released.
The sentencing jury or judge is directed to evaluate evidence
and to return a special verdict, "setting forth its findings as to the
existence or nonexistence of" these aggravating or mitigating circumstances.3 2 2 If the court finds that there are one or more of the aggravating factors, and that none of the mitigating factors exists, imposition of the death penalty is mandatory. 3 23 On the other hand, if the
special verdict finds that none of the aggravating factors exists, or that
one or more of the mitigating factors exists, the court may not impose
the death penalty.3 24 Although an appeal from a death sentence is not
automatic, an appeal if timely made must be granted, and any such

appeal is to be given "priority over all other cases. '"325 The appellate
court is to consider the entire record of the case in making its
determination. 3 26 If the sentencing-hearing findings of fact were
"clearly erroneous," the court must vacate and remand "for imposia
If proper sentencing procetion of a sentence other than death. "327
3
dures were not followed, it must remand for resentencing;

2s

but if

the error of law were "harmless," or if no clear error of fact were
3 29
apparent, the court must affirm the death sentence.
The Constitutionalityof the Death Penalty in S. 1
It must be conceded that S. l's bifurcated sentencing procedure
for determining the applicability of the death penalty is far superior
to that which prevailed prior to Furman v. Georgia.330 Nevertheless,
the legislative skill which has clearly gone into its draftsmanship has
321
322
323
324

id. § 2401(b)(6).
Id. § 2402(d).
Id. § 2402(e)(1).
Id. § 2402(e)(2). The court must, upon such a finding, sentence the defendant to

a fine (up to $100,000) or imprisonment (up to life). A term of probation is not permitted. Compare id. with id. §§ 2001(b), 2101(a), 2201(b)(1)(A), 2301(b)(1).
The Government has the burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating

circumstances and must establish them beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has
the burden of establishing any existing mitigating circumstances; however, he need es-

tablish them only by a preponderance of the evidence, and any mitigating factors are to
be "liberally construed." Id. § 2402(c).
325 Id. § 3726(a).
32 Id. § 3726(b). This includes evidence submitted at trial, the presentence report
(if any was submitted), "information submitted during the sentencing hearing," the procedures employed therein, and the findings with respect to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id.
327 Id. §§ 3726(c)(2), (d)(3).
321 Id. §§ 3726(c)(1), (d)(2).
329 ld. § 3726(d)(1).
330

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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not succeeded in eliminating the potential for arbitrariness and ca-

price which led to that decision.
The first problem in S. 1 concerns the definitional overbreadth
and vagueness of the crimes for which the statute would authorize the
death penalty. Particularly significant is that S. 1 expands the imposition of the death penalty to include a wide range of people under the
espionage and sabotage provisions. 3 31 Terms such as "knowing that
national defense information may be used" in a wav harmful to the
United States or "may be communicated to a foreign power" operate
as vague catchalls in the espionage provision.3 3 2 Similarly, "caus[ing]
damage to . . . a means of defense" may lead to a Class A felony
conviction under the sabotage provision and, possibly, the death
penalty.3 3 3 While the gravest danger posed by these sections lies in
331 See S.
1 §§ 1111, 1121. The definitions of these crimes in S. I are substantially
the same as those in S. 1400 which were criticized for their vagueness and overbreadth
by William G. Florence, an experienced security, consultant. Specifically, Florence contended that the terms "associate nation" and "communicate" would extend the reach of
these provisions to parties never heretofore in danger of prosecution for these offenses.
He added that the terms "property" and "information" have the same effect of expanding these definitions. Hearings, supra note 2, at 6912-15 (Statement of William G. Florence).
The expansiveness of espionage and sabotage under S. 1 becomes readily apparent
when compared with analogous provisions currently in force in 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970)
(espionage) and id. §§ 2151-57 (sabotage). Whereas 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970) defines espionage as communicating information which "is to be used to the injury of the United
States" (emphasis added), S. 1 defines it as communicating "information [which] may
be used to the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States." S. 1 § 1121(a)
(emphasis added).
Similarly, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 2154 (1970) defines sabotage as "construct[ing] in a
defective manner any war material, war premises or war utilities," S. 1 defines it as
damaging "any property that is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of,
the United States or an associate nation. ' S. 1 § 1111(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The
broad definitions of these crimes in S. I subject a vast number of citizens to possible
prosecution. In turn, prosecution under these provisions will expose some people to
conviction and the possibility of capital punishment. See generally Crystal, supra note
11, at 602-04, 632-37.
2
332 See S. 1 § 11 1(a), which provides:
A person is guilt\ of an offense, if. knowing that national defense information
may be used to the prejudice of the safets or interest of the United States, or
to the advantage of a foreign power, lie:
(1) communicates such information to a foreign power;
(2) obtains or collects such information, knowing that it may be communicated to a foreign power; or
(3) enters a restricted area with intent to obtain or collect such information, knowing that it may be communicated to a foreign power.
333 See id. § Ill1(b)(1), which provides that one committing sabotage is guilty of a
Class A felony if "the offense is committed in time of war; and .. .causes damage to ...
a means of defense . . . against large scale attack." See also id. § 2401(a) (1) (B):
"[K]nowingly creat[ing] a grave risk of substantial impairment of the national defense"
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their potential for government reprisal against dissidents and repression of first amendment freedoms, it is also apparent that they do not
meet the Furman requirement that categories of crimes be "more
narrowly defined. -334
The potential for capital punishment is also expanded in S. 1 for
crimes which had heretofore been categorized as second-degree murder. Specifically, the crime of murder would include "engag[ing] in
conduct that causes the death of another person under circumstances
in fact manifesting extreme indifference to human life. ' 3 3 5 Such language opens the door to a wide range of interpretations. For instance,
what are the "circunstances" that in fact manifest "extreme indifference to human life"? When does indifference to human life become
"extreme"? The provision is rendered harsher by the fact that the
only state of mind that need be proven is that the defendant was
aware of the nature of his conduct" and "aware of a risk that the result will occur but disregards the risk."336 Intent, normally a prerequisite of second-degree murder,3 3 7 need not be proven. 33 8 In addition, there are no affirmative defenses available by which to reduce
the charge. 3 39 While a defendant may plead loss of control as an affiris one of three aggravating factors in S. 1 which may subject a person convicted of
espionage, treason, or sabotage to the death penalty.
334 See text accompanying note 271 supra.
335S. 1 § 1601(a)(2). This is a Class A felony which may be punishable by death.
See id. §§ 1601(c), 2401(a)(2). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970), which limits the death
penalty to murder in the first degree which is defined as
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder
perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or atte,,pt t. pcrpctate, an ason, rp,, hurglary, or robbery: or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any
human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
336S. 1 § 1601(a)(2) does not specify a required state of mind. Id. § 303(b) provides
that where there is no specified state of mind included in the offense, "conduct" must
be "'knowing'" and "a result" must be " 'reckless.'" A defendant's state of mind is

"knowing with respect to ... his conduct if he is aware of the nature of his conduct."
Id. § 302(b)(1). His state of mind is "reckless with respect to ... a result of his conduct
if he is aware of a risk that the result will occur but disregards the risk." Id. § 302(c)(2).
337See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 73, at 568 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT], wherein second degree murder is described as
"intent-to-kill murder without the added ingredients of premeditation and deliberation."
The provision in S. I is similar to the "depraved heart" homicide, normally a seconddegree murder offense, and an exception to the "intent" requirement. Compare id.with
id.§ 70, at 529.
338See note 336 supra and text accompanying note 335 supra.
"9 See S. I § 1601(b), which provides affirmative defenses for all murder offenses
except that involving conduct causing death under circumstances "manifesting extreme
indifference to hunan life." Coipare id.with id.§ 1601(a)(2). See also note 340 intfa.
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mative defense to knowingly causing the death of another person,
thereby reducing the offense to manslaughter,3 40 he may not plead loss
of control as a defense to causing death by engaging in conduct which
shows "extreme indifference to human life." It should be noted that
previous proposals to eliminate the distinctions between first and second degree murder offenses were predicated on the elimination of the
death penalty, which had necessitated the distinction in the first
place.341 S. 1 flies in the face of this rationale by raising what heretofore had not been a capital crime into that category.
The second problem in S. 1 is that the vagueness which permeates the statutory definitions of the substantive criminal offenses
also permeates the definitions of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under which the death penalty will be mandated or

precluded.

3 42

340 See id.§ 1601(b)(1), which provides that one prosecuted for "knowingly caus[ing)
the death of another person" may affirmatively defend on grounds
that the death was caused under circumstances, for which the defendant was
not responsible, that:
(A) caused the defendant to lose his self-control; and
(B) would be likely to cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control to at
least the same extent ....
If this is found to be the case, the offense becomes manslaughter, a Class C felony,
calling for a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years. See id. §§ 1602(a)(2),
230 1(b)(3).
In addition, one prosecuted for murder while engaging in, inter alia, treason, sabotage, or arson may affirmatively defend on grounds
that the death was neither a necessary nor a reasonably foreseeable consequence of:
(A) the underlying offense; or
(B) the particular circumstances under which the underlying offense was
committed.
Id. § 1601(b)(2).
34i For instance, the Brown Commission recommended combining first and second
degree murder into one noncapital offense, for the explicit reason that capital punishment-which had been the origin for the distinction between first and second degree
murder-had virtually disappeared. BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, § 1601,
Comment, at 173-74. See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 337, § 73, at 563 & n.ll, in
which the authors call the elimination of the distinction between first and second degree murder an attempt "to limit the reach of the death penalty sanction." The Brown
Commission stated that if the death penalty were retained in federal law, "a degree
system involving discriminations made by the jury at the trial stage would be a prerequisite." BROWN CO1MMISSION REPORT, supra at 174. While the Commission eliminated
the death penalty in its proposed code, an "alternate" death penalty provision, set out
in the report in brackets, confined the death sentence to those "convicted of intentional
murder," or certain other specified offenses. Id. [§ 3601] (emphasis added). However,
even under this proposal, a death sentence was precluded if certain mitigating factors
were present. See id. [§§ 3602-04] & Comments, at 312-15.
342See notes 299-324 supra and accompanying text.
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For example, one circumstance which would mandate death for
one convicted of treason, espionage or sabotage is that he "knowingly
created a grave risk of substantial impairment of the national
defense. "3 43 What precisely are the boundaries of "the national defense"? What constitutes "impairment"? And when does impairment
become "substantial"? It seems obvious that a determination of the
existence or nonexistence of this circumstance, upon which the life or
death of the defendant depends, may be based upon subjective and
varying interpretations by the sentencer. The broad impact of this
provision, when applied in conjunction with the vaguely defined
crime of espionage, is demonstrated by the fact that under the proposed code, one such as Dr. Daniel Ellsberg could have been subjected to the death penalty . 4 4 For instance, under "espionage," a
person is guilty
if, knowing that national defense information may be used to the

prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States, or to the
advantage of a foreign power, he . . . obtains or collects such in-

formation knowing that it may be commnunicated to a foreign
power. 345
Clearly, publication in the news media would result in communicating information to a foreign power, which then may or max not use
the information in a manner detrimental to American interests. Thus,
merely by obtaining and publishing information such as the Pentagon
Papers, Dr. Ellsberg and the publishers of The New York Times and
Washington Post could have been prosecuted under this provision.
The section further provides that espionage shall be a Class A
in time of ar, wbether declared or undeu,,y f1 comm..itted
..
clared.3 4 6 Thus, since publication of the Pentagon Papers occurred
during the Vietnam War, the publishers and Dr. Ellsberg could have
been convicted of a Class A felony and possibly sentenced to death. If

the judge or jury found that publication of such documents "created a
grave risk of substantial impairment of the national defense" and that
47
the defendants were aware of this risk, death would be mandatory.3
Similarly, under the sabotage provision, a worker who tampered
S. 1 § 2401(a)(1)(B).
This conclusion was reached by Profess6r Harold Edgar, Hearings, supra note 2,
at 7122, and the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, id. at 5690, in discussing the possible
ranifications of S. 1400-substantially the sane as the current bill.
345 S. I § 1121(a)(2) (emphasis added).
343
344

346
347

Id. § 1121(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 1121(a)(1)(B).
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with any property of the United States or property of an associate
nation "with intent to . . . interfere with . . . the ability of the United
States . . . to prepare for . . . war or defense activities" would be
guilty of a Class A felony if he damaged "a means of defense . . .
against large scale attack. - 3 4 8 Commentators have already noted that
there need be only a threshold finding of "intent to . .. interfere"
and that such intent could be found in the case of anti-Vietnam protestors "who 'interfered with' public transportation by their very
numbers. '' 3 4 9 When combined with the vagueness inherent in the
phrase "tampered with" and the virtually unlimited definitions of
property, .. damage," and "means of defense," it can be seen that
-theoretically at least-one who scratched the paint on a bomb as a
sign of protest against an ongoing undeclared war could be prosecuted for a Class A felony and, if it were his second such offense,
3 °
subject to a mandatory death penalty. 5
The aggravating circumstances which would mandate death for a
convicted murderer 35 1 are also objectionably vague. For example,
death is mandated if "the defendant committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. "352 \Vhere is the line
to be drawn between "heinous" (life) and "especially heinous" (death);
between "cruel" (life) and "especially ...
cruel" (death)? It is apparent that the sentencers' distinctions in these instances can only be
based on subjectiv e reactions xvhich lead to arbitrariness in application of the death penalty.
The same vagueness that characterizes the definitions of aggravating circumstances may also be found in the definitions of mitigating
circumstances. 35 3 Particularly subject to wide and varying interpretations are those circumstances which pertain to a defendant's mental
38

Id. § 1111.

349 See Hearings on S. I Before the Subcomii.

on Criminal Laiws anrd Proceduresof
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12, at 198 (1975) (statement
on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union). The A.C.L.U. took the position that such
a sabotage provision would in effect "make every public demonstration, no matter how

peaceful and orderly, subject to criminal sanctions at the iron whim of official power,"
id., and recommended that it "be narrowed to apply only to culpable physical damage
to military hardware." Id. at 199.
350 See S. 1 § 1111. See also id. § 2401(a)(1)(A), which provides that one convicted of
sabotage shall be sentenced to death if
the defendant has been convicted of another offense involving treason, sabotage, or espionage, committed before the time of the offense, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was authorized.
See generally notes 303-14 supra and accompanying text.
352 S. 1 § 2401(a)(2)(E).
351

353 See generally notes 315-21 supra and accompanying text.
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state. A defendant convicted of a Class A felony cannot be subjected
to the death penalty if his "mental capacity was significantly impaired,
3 54
although not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.-

On what basis is a jury to determine when mental impairment becomes "significant"? Similarly, a defendant cannot be subjected to the
death penalty if he "was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to prosecution. '"' 5 What is "unusual"? What is "substantial"?
There is also inherent arbitrariness in protecting a murderer

who-having killed his victim in the course of a kidnapping or airplane hijacking during which he also took hostages-releases those
hostages in reliance upon a promise of immunity, while imposing

death on one who did not aggravate the crime by taking or retaining hostages. 35 6 Despite the desire of S. l's drafters to provide protection for hostages, this provision constitutes legislative approval for

making deals with murderers. In effect, the statute rewards the criminal who compounds his offense by taking hostages.
The problems of vagueness and arbitrariness are exacerbated by
the lack of a meaningful review process.3 5 7 There are no provisions

for the compilation of data on when the death sentence has or has not
been imposed, 35 8 and no directive to the reviewing court that it take
354 S. 1 § 2401(b)(2).
355 Id. § 2401(b)(3).
356 The statute provides specifically that a defendant convicted of murder in connection with kidnapping or aircraft hijacking would be spared the death penalty if he released hostages upon a personal promise by the Attorney General that he would not be
sentenced to death. Id. § 2401(b)(6).
357

Spp notp

.;9_5-'4 V11.1prn A

accompanVing tpxt

S. 1 does require that in each case the jury or judge give "a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence or nonexistence of [any aggravating or
mitigating] factors," S. 1 § 2402(d), and that this special verdict shall be considered on
appeal, id. § 3726(b)(5), there is no specification that the findings be explained in any
detail. Also, if some mitigating circumstance is found (thus precluding a death sentence), no appellate court will ever see the findings. See id. § 3725(c). No easy means of
access to prior courts' reasoning is established for use in any defendant's case.
Contrast this approach with that provided in a somewhat comparable death penalty
statute enacted by the Florida legislature. The Florida statute, which also provides a
separate sentencing hearing and consideration of specified aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, mandates appellate review within 60 days after trial. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 (Supp. 1975-76). In order to provide "meaningful review," the trial judge is
required to justify his sentences of death in writing. Id. § 921.141(3). The Florida supreme court deemed this recordkeeping so vital that it ordered trial judges also to support their findings in writing when life imprisonment, rather than death, is imposed. See
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973). The court reasoned that
requiring these findings by the judge provides an additional safeguard for the
defendant sentenced to death in that it provides a standard for life imprison358 While
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into consideration other criminal proceedings of a similar nature to
insure that the death penalty imposed in the instant case is consistent
35 9
with penalties levied in similar cases.
While the problems so far enumerated regarding S. l's acceptability under Furman may be resolved by narrowing the definitions of
crimes subject to the death penalty and providing for a more comprehensive reviewing process, the solution is by no means complete.
This is because discretion and the potential for arbitrariness in appli3 60
cation of the death penalty do not rest with the sentencer alone.
defendant's case, and again avoids the possibility of discriminatory sentences of
death.

Id.
359 The Georgia supreme court emphasized the importance of this aspect of review
in finding the Georgia death penalty constitutional. See Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834,
204 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1974) (per curiam). The Georgia statute provides mandatory review
by the state supreme court within 10 days of receiving the transcript. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2537 (Supp. 1974). The court must consider, inter alia,
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and

(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
id. §§ 2 7 - 2 53 7 (c)(1), (3). The court is further instructed to "include in its decision a
reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration." Id. § 27-2537(e).
In Coley, the court justified its finding of constitutionality under Furman on four
grounds, three of which were provided by appellate review alone: the assurance that
the sentence was supported by the evidence, the assurance that "excessive" penalties
would be avoided by striking down the death penalty if it had been "rarely imposed" in
similar cases, and the assurance that the penalty' would be voided if there had been any
evidence in the record of "arbitrariness or discrimination" in imposing the sentence.
231 Ga. at 834, 204 S.E.2d at 616.
360 This is the major objection voiced by Professor Louis B. Schwartz, formerly director of the Brown Commission, who stated that
[p]erhaps the chief vice of the so-called "mandatory" capital punishment
scheme . . . is that no such scheme can in fact be mandatory under our system
of criminal law. Instead, the selection of persons to be executed will pass from
the open courtroom control of judges and jurors to two types of executive officials operating virtually behind the scrutiny of the public: the President,
exercising his power to pardon or commute sentences, and the prosecutors, exercising their power to select the charge to be brought and to engage in "plea
bargaining" which will result in dropping a capital charge in exchange for
defendant's plea of guilty to a non-capital charge. It is notorious that in England, where death used to be the mandatory sentence for murder, the actual
choice to execute or not became a routine function of the Home Office. It is
also well known that in this country, the enactment of statutes giving juries
unbridled discretion with respect to capital punishment in first degree murder
cases was a consequence of the systematic evasion of first degree convictions
which then carried a mandatory deatfi sentence.
Schwartz, supra note 65, at 3206-07.
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Vast discretion is vested with the prosecutor who is free to engage in
plea bargaining-trading off the threat of a charge carrying the death
penalty for a guilty plea to a lesser, noncapital charge. This bargaining power continues even after conviction of a Class A felony; for by
stipulating that a mitigating circumstance exists, the prosecutor automatically precludes the imposition of the death penalty. 36 1 Thus,
one can visualize a convicted felon exchanging information in return
for a promise that he will be spared the death penalty. Similar discretion is vested in the President, who holds the ultimate power to
pardon.

36 2

Finally, one is reminded of the "Catch 22" nature of any attempt
to formulate a fair and just death penalty procedure. On one hand,
discretion in sentencing procedures permits imposition of death at
the subjective "whim" of juries, leading to the arbitrariness objected
to by the Furman majority. On the other, limiting the sentencer to
consideration of specific "objective" standards precludes consideration of a myriad of other potentially valid mitigating factors, such as
the possibility of rehabilitation or the impact on the defendant's dependents. Thus, as discretion breeds arbitrariness, so does its absence. 36 3 Ultimately, both legislators and courts must face the fact
that any system of capital punishment is bound, in some respects, to
be arbitrary. Whether this will lead to an eventual finding that the
death penalty is per se unconstitutional by the Supreme Court may be
resolved by its forthcoming decision in Fowler. However, any decision
short of a finding of unconstitutionality per se may have little impact
on S. 1 due to the substantial differences between its death penalty
procedure and that of North Carolina.364
361 See S. 1 § 2402(a).
362 U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2.

363 This is true not only because the removal of discretion from capital punishment

determinations may' result in acquittals by juries reluctant to allow for any possibility of

the death penalty, but that even when death is mandatory, discrimination persists. See,
e.g., W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (1974), wherein the author notes that studies

of jurisdictions for which homicide statistics are available for three years before and
after the change from a discretionary to mandatory death penalty show that the mandatory penalty is not superior to the discretionary as a deterrent to murder and that it "has
been associated with higher levels of execution, with comparable levels of racial discrimination, and, very likely, with reduced levels of capital convictions." Id. at 162. The
author suggests that the type of capital punishment which would be needed to provide
"unique deterrent effects," may be "something more arbitrary and excessive than we
have yet experienced." Id. at 163.
See also C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1974), wherein Professor Black cogently
demonstrates the impossibility of fair and rational application of the death penalty.
364 The North Carolina statute mandates death upon conviction for explicitly defined capital offenses. See note 284 supra and accompanying text. S. 1, with its separate
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In addition to the threat of arbitrariness, the death penalty provisions of S. 1 portend serious consequences in the realn of first
amendment rights. In essence, the bill would effectively provide a
vehicle for governmental reprisal against protestors and other "political criminals" which extends to the taking of life itself-a frightening
possibility for those who have witnessed the administrative abuse of
power which has occurred over the past decade. 3 6 5 Typical of the
thrust of this statute are those provisions which would automatically
subject those who commit murder in connection with espionage to
death, while not so subjecting those who coimnit murder in connection with rape or robbery. Whatever the motives of those who drafted
sentencing procedure, is wholly different. See generally notes 285 and 296-329 supra
and accompanying text. Further, while North Carolina explicitly provides that lesser
offenses are included within an indictment for a capital crime, see, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-21(b) (Supp. 1974), it is not clear whether a jury could have discretion
under S. 1 to convict for a lesser included crime.
Thus, if the Fowler Court chooses to focus on these specific provisions of the North
Carolina statute, i.e., jury discretion in returning verdicts of lesser included charges and
the lack of any standards, its holding may have little impact on the federal statute.
365 According to figures released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation undertook "at least 238 illegal burglaries against
dissident American groups and individuals from 1942 to April, 1968," not including
similar burglaries instituted in national security or organized crime cases. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 2. Such burglaries were acknowledged as being " 'clearly
illegal' " by William C. Sullivan, Chief of F.B.I. counterintelligence. Id. at 15, col. I
(quoting from memo from William C. Sullivan to Cartha D. DeLoach, July 19, 1966).
According to Mr. Sullivan's successor, Charles Brennan, the Bureau came tinder
'tremendous pressure' " from Presidents Johnson and Nixon to investigate the financial sources of the American antiwar movement. Id. at 15, col. 1. The figures and testimony were elicited by the Senate intelligence committee during its investigation of a
domestic surveillance scheme developed for President Nixon in 1970 by aide Tom
Charles Huston. Id. Although approved by President Nixon, it was discontinued after J.
Edgar Hoover refused to implement it. Id. However, the F.B.I. subsequently embarked
on an informer expansion
aimed at developing 6,500 new cases on members of Students for a Democratic
Society, and 4,000 new cases on members of black student unions "'regardless
of their present or past incolvement in student disorders."
Id. (quoting from statement by Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence) (emphasis added).
See also N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 38, cols. 1-8 (lists of secret White House
"enemies" compiled during 1972). Included on the "enemies" lists were prominent
businessmen, organizations, celebrities, academicians, members of the media, and labor
officials. The plan was to
"maximize the fact of [the administration's] incumbency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition to our Administration. Stated a bit
more bluntly-how we can use the available Federal machinery to screw our
political enemies."
Id. at col. 7 (quoting from Memo from John W. Dean 3d (counsel to President Nixon) to
John D. Ehrlichman (White House advisor) and H.R. Haldeman (White House Chief of
Staff)).
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the capital punishment provisions in S. 1, the effect must be to chill
first amendment rights when those rights are exercised in protest
against governmental

policy.

36 6

The threat of potential execution

which hovers over a broad range of vaguely defined acts is in itself
sufficient to render inactive all but the most stubborn proponents of
individual rights.
The Morality of the Death Penalty
Ultimately, legislators must confront the moral question. Constitutional issues aside, should Congress vote to reinstate a penalty
which is incredibly harsh and ugly, 367 irrevocable, costly both in a
monetary sense 368 and in the inroads it makes into our sense of

human dignitV, 369 and which experience has shown to be of negligible, if any, deterrent value? 370 Should Congress vote to reinstate a
penalty w\vhich, for a number of reasons, falls not on the "well-heeled
gangster, the professional killer," but on the poor and disadvantaged
3 71
of our society?
366 For a detailed analysis of the impact of S. 1 on first amendment rights see
Crystal, supra note 11.
367 As Justice Brennan pointed out in Furman,
[n]o other existing punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical and
mental suffering. . . . [T]here is no method available that guarantees an immediate and painless death.
408 U.S. at 287 (concurring opinion). For a description of the "long walk" and death by
electrocution see \4. DISALLE, THE POWER OF LIFE OR DEATH 84-85 (1965).
368 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 357-58 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
See also Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes: Perpetuating a Costly Myth, 9
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of maintaining a condemned man on death row[,] . . . executing him," and "the inordinate cost of the trial, appeal, and collateral proceedings."
369 The death penalty involves the deliberate, calculated infliction of intense physical and psychological pain which ends irrevocably in extinguishing a human life. It
denies the potential for rehabilitation. It is invariably imposed on the poor. Justice
Brennan's assessment of capital punishment in Furman is well taken: If it has any effect
at all on society's moral code, "it tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our
values. That, after all, is why we no longer carry out public executions." 408 U.S. at 303
(concurring opinion).
310 See note 363 supra. See also W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 193-95
(1974); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 264 (H. Bedau ed. 1964); M. DISALLE,
THE POWER OF LIFE OR DEATH 7-9 (1965); Browning, supra note 368, at 663-70.
"I See -M. DISALLE, THE POWER OF LIFE OR DEATH 10 (1965), wherein former

Governor DiSalle terms the death penalty 'class legislation'" in that it is invariably inflicted on the poor:
I have never seen a person of means go to the chair. It is the well-heeled
gangster, the professional killer who can afford the best legal talent to defend
him, who gets off with a lesser sentence. It is the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the minority group-the mlan who because he is
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Two of our Supreme Court Justices, after an exhaustive study of
available data, concluded in Furman that in light of viable alternatives, the death penalty has no redeeming value.3 72 Three other Justices condemned its arbitrary application. 3 73 Perhaps the most telling
statement was made by Justice Blackmun, who, like the other dissenters in Furm-an, held that capital punishment was an issue to be
resolved by legislators.3 74 Justice Blackmun stated:
I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of
physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite
minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me,
it violates childhood's training and life's experiences, and is not
compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been able to
develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life."
Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the
policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective petitioners and
expressed and adopted in the several opinions filed by the Justices
3 75
who vote to reverse these judgments.

The Chief Justice, in an opinion joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, substantially agreed.376
As pointed out by Judge James Browning of the Ninth Circuit,
[t]his nearly unanimous view of the Justices of the Supreme
Court that the death penalty is undesirable . . . is surely entitled to

without means is defended by a court-appointed attorney-who becomes
society's blood sacrifice.
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
366 (Marshall, J., concurring).
In addition, the death penalty has been imposed in a disproportionately high percentage of cases involving racial minorities. See id. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring). Removal of discretion at the sentencing level, as
in mandatory death penalties, has not decreased the incidence of racial discrimination
in imposition of the death penalty. See W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 192
(1974).
372 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 354, 357, 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
373 Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
313 (White, J., concurring).
374 Id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
375 Id. at 405-06 (concurring opinion).
376 See id. at 375 (concurring opinion);
If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either join xwith Mr.
Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall or, at the very least, restrict the
use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes.
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great weight in deciding whether the death penalty, however restricted its application, is a defensible instrument in the adminstra3 77
tion of* criminal justice.
Judge Browning concluded that there is no justification for capital
punishment. It "will not reduce crime," and legislatures which have
reinstated it on that premise "must eventually learn that they and the
people have been misled. "378
Former Ohio governor Michael V. DiSalle has written at length
on the utter uselessness and tragic consequences of capital punishment, pointing out that it falls only on the poor, that its imposition
depends on the ambitions of the prosecutor and the emotional response of the jury, and that mistakes are made which death makes
37 9
irrevocable .
The American Civil Liberties Union, in testimony before the
Senate subcommittee on July 19, 1974, urged Congress not to disgrace itself by reenacting a law historically tainted by invidious application. "Our claims to moral progress and to equal justice," the
A.C.L.U. added, "are mocked by the infliction of savage and final
retribution against those least able to defend their cases in court. "380
Perhaps most eloquent of all is the language of the Supreme
Court of California in overturning that state's death penalty provision:
we have concluded that capital pulishment is impermissibly
cruel. It degrades and dehumanizes all who participate in its processes. It is unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state and is
incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial process. Our
conclusion . . . is not grounded in sympathy for those who Would
co.mmit ie s of violece, but in cofllorn fnr flip snoiety that diminishes itself whenever it takes the life of one of its members.
Lord Chancellor Cardiner reminded the House of Lords, debating
abolition of capital punishnent in England: "When we abolished

the punishment for treason that you should be hanged, and then
cut down while still alive, and then disembowelled while still alive,
and then quartered, we did not abolish that punishment because
we sympathized with traitors, but because wxe took the xview that it
'
was a punishment no longer consistent with our self respect."3 81

377

Browning, supra note 368, at 665.

18 1d. at 705.
379

See NI. DISALLI, THE POWER OF LIFE OR DEATH 5-6, 10-11 (1965).

380 ACLU Statement Re: S. 1400, supra note 50, at 7973.
381

People v. Anderson, 6 CAL. 3d 628, 656, 493 P.2d 880, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,

171 (1972) (quoting f'rom 268 PAHL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 703 (1965)).
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CONCLUSION

It has been widely recognized that the federal criminal law is in
need of immediate revision. As Senator NIcClellan noted when introducing S. 1 to the Congress, the United States has never before in its
history had "a true criminal code." 3 82 The current Title 18 of the
United States Code represents nothing more than a compilation of
the many criminal statutes unsystematically enacted by Congress during the past two hundred years. Despite attempts to consolidate and
revise this body of statutes, the "[elxisting Federal criminal law is a
hodgepodge of new and ancient provisions." 38 3 The adoption of S. 1,
however, would replace an outmoded criminal code with new legislation as repressive and threatening to individual liberties as any in our
nation's history. Undeniably, "[t]he nation can better afford continuing with the problems of lack of codification than it can with a pervasive hardening of its legal arteries. "384
What S. 1 offers as deterrence is nothing more, in substance,
than the warehousing of those convicted of crimes. The fallacies inherent in this simplistic law-and-order approach to crime are selfevident.
Our prisons are already overcrowded, providing inadequate
psychiatric treatment and rehabilitative help. In such an environment, there is little opportunity or motivation for self-improvement.
When he returns to the streets, the ex-convict finds few job opportunities and is no more prepared to live in a social environment than
he was before his imprisonment. Furthermore, prison has proved to
be a place of limited educational opportunity. If anything, the
prisoner's education is reduced to the mastering of new skills in la\\
breaking under the tutelage of his fellow inmates. Crime in America
can be successfull reduced only by attacking its source-those social
conditions which demean a human being and strip him of his dignity.
Since S. 1 is imbued with a punitive sentencing approach, an
approach wvhich paradoxically may serve to increase rather than to
decrease crime, the ultimate issue is whether to amend S. 1 or to
scrap it and make a new start.
Professor Louis B. Schwartz has said, "Give me a week and I can
make the entire bill perfectly acceptable. '"385 More realistically, how382 121 Co.Nx. REC. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1975).
383 N.Y. Times, June 22, 1975, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
384 Letter from Morton Stavis to the New Jersey Laic Journal, October 16, 1975, 98

N.J.L.J. 876, 896 (1975).
385 Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1975, § A, at 2.
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ever, Professors Vern Countryman of Harvard Law School and
Thomas I. Emerson of Yale Law School declared their view that S. I

"isinherently unamendable and should be recommitted for complete
overhaul and redrafting." In explaining their conclusion that S. 1
"cannot be satisfactorily patched up by the amendment process,"
these two distinguished Professors of Law stated that the objectionable provisions so completely pervade the statute that a complete revamping 'would have to be made. Furthermore, because of the overwhelming emotional and psychological strain that would be the result
of the extensive congressional process of amending, re-amending, arguing, negotiating and finally voting on each and every offending provision, "the pressures would be irresistible to make a few changes
and let the rest go through. "386
And as Professors Countryman and Emerson make clear, it
would be an exercise in futility to attempt to excise from this bill
the pervasive law-and-order and antilibertarian philosophy of a discredited and arrogant administration, an administration which promoted S. 1 in the hope that it would serve as a weapon of repression
3 87
and an instrument of political corruption.
The need for a revamping of the federal criminal law into a coherent code is indisputable. Equally beyond challenge is the pervasive
fear of crime in American society. However, the fear of crime cannot

be allowed to serve as a springboard for the transformation of a national priority-a federal criminal code-into a national disgrace.
With the perpetual bandying about of the word "freedom" in the
rhetoric of both political aspirants and incumbents, its meaning has to
a large extent been neutralized. Nonetheless, it is crucial that Congress reexamine the meaning of freedom and its role as the core precept of the American political experiment. As our Government enters
its two hundredth year, Congress can, by rejecting S.1, demonstrate
its disavowal of national solutions engendered by expediency and fostered by the cynicism of political opportunists.
36 Country man & Emerson, Statement on S. 1, June 1975 (circulated by Nat.
Comm. Against Repressive Legislation, Los Angeles, Cal.).
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